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Executive summary 
Existing national and international standards for accounting for nuclear materials, including those designated for military use, are insucient to meet current and future nuclear security, nonproliferation, 
and weapons reduction demands. Improved accounting practices are needed 
to provide reliable assurance that nuclear materials designated for peaceful use 
have not been diverted to state-level nuclear weapons programs or stolen by 
non-state actors, as well as to deter or detect diversion or the, were it to occur. 
Implementing an eective and ecient comprehensive, global nuclear accounting 
system is also a critical element of creating the conditions for future nuclear 
security if global nuclear energy use increases as part of the eort to mitigate 
climate change and countries make deep cuts to, or potentially eliminate, their  
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials designated for military use.
Policy makers from around the globe have recognized the importance of 
ensuring that all countries with nuclear materials or weapons practice high 
standards of material control and accounting (MC&A), but the emphasis of 
current initiatives to improve MC&A has been on national laws and regulations—
and primarily in states without nuclear weapons. States have yet to develop 
comprehensive requirements that address the full scope of nuclear risks and that 
are meant to be adopted by all states—including nuclear weapons states.
is study examines a range of current material accounting practices and 
requirements and argues that in order for MC&A to fully perform the functions 
necessary to reduce global nuclear risks to an acceptably low level, its emphasis 
needs to transition from ensuring the non-diversion of nuclear materials to 
military uses to providing positive inventory control of nuclear materials, whereby 
national and international authorities can actively account for the location and 
form of all designated nuclear materials on a continuous and detailed basis.
Near-term steps to achieve higher standards of nuclear accounting 
By beginning to rethink the specic goals of MC&A and the current requirements 
on national- and facility-level systems, all states can ensure that they are equipped 
to meet the current and future demands of policy makers and the public for high 
standards of accounting and managerial control over all types of nuclear materials. 
Indeed, as states reevaluate their nuclear material accounting requirements 
and pursue near-term nuclear accounting objectives in coordination with each 
other, they would facilitate eorts to achieve the more dicult objectives of 
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implementing a comprehensive global system that can provide the level of eective 
and ecient accounting needed for a world with much more nuclear energy use 
and many fewer nuclear weapons. 
Below is a brief list of near-term action items that national governments should 
pursue: 
For non-nuclear weapons states. IAEA member states should review whether 
IAEA MC&A requirements for states with comprehensive safeguards agreements 
and in-force Additional Protocols are sucient to meet emerging security threats, 
including the detection and deterrence of nuclear material diversion to state-level 
weapons programs and to non-state actors, and the potential for insider threats. In 
particular, they should consider: 
•	 expanding the accounting and reporting requirements for certain 
source materials to include reporting mass measurements for uranium 
ore concentrate, ensuring the transit matching of uranium ore concentrate 
drums, and tracking uranium hexauoride containers with the assistance of 
universal unique identifying numbers; 
•	 increasing the required reporting frequency of changes to special 
ssionable material inventories and the frequency of physical inventories 
at both process and storage facilities for special ssionable materials;
•	 instituting advanced information management tools, including IAEA 
mailboxes, at all facilities with special ssionable materials to ensure the 
timely, electronic reporting of nuclear material accounting information 
from the facility level to the agency; and
•	 requiring all facilities with nuclear materials to maintain and operate 
electronic databases of nuclear material accounting information and be 
capable of electronically transmitting or sharing that data with national 
and international authorities.
For nuclear weapons states. All nuclear weapons states, including those outside 
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), should review the structure and 
requirements of their national- and facility-level MC&A systems in light of emerging 
security threats, including the possibility of diversion of nuclear materials to non-
state actors, the potential for insider threats, and the need to provide assurance that 
special ssionable materials are not redirected to military use. 
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In particular, all of these states should consider adopting MC&A requirements 
that at a minimum meet enhanced IAEA requirements. Adopting these 
requirements would improve international understanding of the capabilities of 
accounting systems in these states, and it would signal weapons states’ willingness 
to abide by the same standards imposed on non-nuclear weapons states. Just as 
importantly, accounting for nuclear material in a manner that could support 
further reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles could also help to demonstrate 
these states’ willingness to pursue their NPT Article VI commitments. ese 
states should also consider introducing more stringent nuclear material reporting 
requirements into nuclear cooperation agreements as a way to further guard 
against the non-diversion or misuse of these materials.
All nuclear weapons states should also explore the potential benets of greater 
disclosure about the amounts, status, and location of military-use nuclear 
materials and about how these materials are accounted for on a daily basis. At 
the very least, these states should make publicly available one-time declarations 
about their production and use of special ssionable materials, as the United States 
and the United Kingdom have already done. ey should also be willing to make 
publicly available general information about the management systems in place 
aimed at accounting for and managing military-use materials.
For all states. All states should engage in cooperative research and development 
of technological capabilities that will feed directly into their capacities to 
participate and have condence in a comprehensive nuclear material accounting 
system. Possible areas of collaboration include:
•	 development of information systems that can facilitate the secure 
exchange of detailed nuclear material accounting information between 
states or between states and an international authority;
•	 development of advanced in-process measurement capabilities that will 
enable real-time material accountancy at process facilities, including 
enrichment, reprocessing, and fuel-fabrication facilities;
•	 development of containment and surveillance technologies that will enable 
continuous monitoring of nuclear materials, including items and bulk 
materials, throughout their lifetimes; 
•	 research on how nuclear material storage and process facilities can be congured to 
ease the physical inventory taking and materials measurement processes; and
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•	 research on the eectiveness of national nuclear regulators and ways to 
improve compliance with MC&A regulations in a manner that contributes 
to transparency eorts.
Many of these technical areas are currently being explored by individual 
national governments, but international, cooperative research and development 
will better ensure that all states have condence in the operating capabilities of the 
many components necessary for more comprehensive MC&A arrangements. 
To make the most of cooperative research and development, a nuclear 
weapons state (preferably the United States) should volunteer to develop a pilot 
initiative that seeks to demonstrate the technological feasibility of continuous, 
detailed accounting of both bulk and item forms of direct-use special ssionable 
materials. is eort should also involve the development and demonstration 
of information systems that are capable of securely storing nuclear material 
accounting information and making a subset of all this information available to an 
international authority or directly to other states according to agreed access rules.
 
Elements of a global comprehensive nuclear accounting system
To minimize risks in a future world where global nuclear energy use may 
have increased substantially and stockpiles of nuclear weapons may have 
been substantially reduced, if not eliminated, all states will have to employ 
comprehensive nuclear material accounting systems and practices that enable 
them to account for certain special ssionable materials on a near-continuous 
basis and other nuclear materials more frequently than they currently do. ey 
will also need to develop information systems that allow for the coordinated 
management of all accounting information about all nuclear materials within 
their national borders. And all states will need to subject their systems to 
extensive enough international monitoring and transparency mechanisms to 
ensure that they all have condence in other states’ accounting and control of 
their materials. 
In order to achieve these objectives, it is not necessary for MC&A systems 
to function identically in every state, but they all need to meet the same 
internationally agreed-upon requirements. e nature of past and current 
arrangements to reduce nuclear risks suggests that achieving further progress 
will involve making accounting requirements more equitable. Building such 
a comprehensive, global nuclear material accounting system will require 
international coordination and considerable political eort. For states to have 
condence in such a system—condence that the system permits them to assess 
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other states’ compliance with their nuclear risk reduction commitments—the 
system will have to operate for a number of years and be rened to address 
emergent concerns.  
is study found that a comprehensive nuclear material accounting system 
would involve at least two levels of requirements: facility level and national level. 
Facility-level requirements. Facilities with nuclear materials maintain 
accounting systems to help their operators—government agencies, government 
contractors, or commercial entities—meet national and international safeguards 
and security requirements. e eectiveness and eciency of a comprehensive 
nuclear material accounting system will rely in large part on the capabilities of 
all facility-level systems to account for materials that are in storage, undergoing 
processing, or awaiting use on a daily (or near-real time) basis—including nuclear 
materials in military use. As such, under a comprehensive system, facilities should 
be required to operate material accounting systems that include:
•	 graded MC&A requirements that include positive inventory control for all 
direct-use special ssionable materials; 
•	 the storage of itemized and bulk special ssionable materials in “smart” 
containers that can be sealed, continuously monitored, and remotely 
interrogated;
•	 the use of monitoring and measurement technologies to account for in-
process special ssionable materials more stringently than currently done;
•	 the consistent tracking of certain source materials—primarily uranium 
hexauoride and uranium ore concentrate—and the containers used to 
transport them;
•	 the use of a uniform, global system of unique item identiers to make it 
easier for national systems to identify changes to material inventories;
•	 the compilation of daily nuclear material book inventories at every 
facility containing nuclear materials, to include all transactions and 
inventory changes; and
•	 more frequent physical inventories of all nuclear materials.
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National-level requirements. All states should be required to maintain a 
national nuclear material accounting system that draws on detailed material 
accounting information from facility-level systems to ensure broad compliance 
with international standards and to provide assurance to international authorities 
and other states in line with larger nuclear security, nonproliferation, and 
weapons reduction commitments. Many existing national material accounting 
systems merely conrm that facility-level operators are meeting their regulatory 
requirements and accounting for nancially and militarily valuable materials 
on an annual basis; other national material accounting systems merely maintain 
aggregate or summarized material accounting information. e level and 
frequency of reporting and access between states and between states and 
international authorities that could be a part of a comprehensive, global nuclear 
material accounting system is open for debate, but any level of transparency and 
frequency of reporting would require a national system that maintains up-to-date 
databases of detailed accounting information. 
Each state should be required to:
•	 develop and deploy a national system capable of electronically receiving 
daily updates of facility-level material accounting information, of directly 
querying facility-level accounting systems, and of sharing a subset or 
aggregate of all material accounting data with an international authority or 
directly with other states;
•	 develop and use information systems capable of compiling daily facility-
level material accounting reports and making a subset of material 
accounting information available to an international authority or other 
states;
•	 maintain an empowered, independent national regulator that is capable of 
evaluating compliance with national and international material accounting 
requirements; and 
•	 routinely and systematically share information about its nuclear material 
stockpiles, including those materials designated for military use, and about 
how it accounts for and controls those materials on a daily basis with an 
international authority or directly with other states.
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Lacking from previous eorts to improve nuclear material accounting standards 
and technological capabilities was sucient guidance and support from national 
policy makers who have thus far failed to appreciate the potential nuclear risk-
reduction benets of having more continuous and detailed information about 
nuclear material holdings. By prioritizing eorts to expand material accounting 
capabilities today and to build a comprehensive, global material accounting system 
with which states could increase transparency and provide greater international 
assurance, policy makers would make a substantive contribution to reducing 
overall nuclear risk for the foreseeable future.
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Section 1. 
Introduction
In the aftermath of World War II, the scientists who developed the nuclear weapons used against Japan and U.S. diplomats proposed that all subsequent development of nuclear technology be managed by an international 
consortium that would maintain strict accounting of all the weapons-usable 
nuclear materials produced. At the time, that aspiration was technically feasible, 
but it quickly proved to be politically unacceptable. 
In the decades that followed, eight additional national governments developed 
nuclear weapons for military application and 44 applied nuclear technology to 
other purposes. Accounting for the nuclear materials produced has been done 
by national governments and international and supranational authorities that do 
not comprehensively aggregate or share the information. As a result, uncertainties 
about global material inventories range in the many thousands of weapons 
equivalents. 
During the Cold War period, uncertainties of this magnitude in nuclear 
weapons states were not thought to be strategically signicant. In the current 
context, every single weapon and equivalent amount of weapons-usable nuclear 
material poses a risk of potentially catastrophic proportions. e legacy of 
inadequate national accounting is distinctly ominous in this context; higher 
standards can and should be achieved.
e opportunity that existed in principle in 1945 cannot be recaptured, and the 
ensuing production of nuclear material by multiple, mutually suspicious national 
governments will impose large accounting uncertainties for many decades to 
come. Nonetheless, the technology for achieving meaningfully higher standards of 
nuclear material accounting is available, and the impediments to achieving those 
standards have mostly to do with institutional inertia and political attitudes. 
e status quo in accounting for and controlling nuclear materials and their 
production needs to be improved upon as states attempt to fulll the promise 
of the nuclear nonproliferation regime’s central tenets—that the technology 
and infrastructure for the production of nuclear energy and other peaceful uses 
is widely available, that those states that have pledged not to acquire nuclear 
weapons employ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to 
conrm that their nuclear programs are purely peaceful, and that those states 
with nuclear weapons decrease and ultimately eliminate their reliance on those 
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weapons. Nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) needs to transition 
from ensuring the non-diversion of nuclear materials to military uses to 
providing positive inventory control of nuclear materials, whereby national and 
international authorities can actively account for all designated nuclear materials 
on a continuous and detailed basis. ese improvements would also help to 
provide reliable assurance that nuclear materials designated for peaceful use in 
nuclear weapons states have not been diverted to weapons use or stolen by non-
state actors.
is transformation requires at least two related steps:
 
(1) In the short term, the IAEA needs to reevaluate and tighten MC&A 
requirements in non-nuclear weapons states to address a broader set of 
nonproliferation and nuclear security objectives, and all nuclear weapons states 
need to commit to maintaining MC&A systems for civilian materials that at a 
minimum meet these improved IAEA requirements. 
(2) In the long-term, all states should be expected to maintain national 
accounting systems for all of their designated nuclear materials—both civilian 
and military-use materials—that meet improved IAEA requirements. ey should 
also be expected to maintain sucient transparency about their operational 
practices and material holdings in support of a broad nuclear risk reduction 
agenda. is requires the development of a comprehensive, global nuclear 
material accounting system.
While the latter step is admittedly aspirational, in that it would require 
signicant political and security transformations, this study argues that 
continuous and detailed accounting of all nuclear materials is necessary to 
reduce the risk of both state-level and non-state level nuclear proliferation and 
to undergird eorts to reduce global nuclear weapons arsenals. International 
security could benet signicantly today if the former goal is achieved. 
International cooperation aimed at developing the necessary technical, regulatory, 
and political infrastructures for the short-term goal also presents an opportunity 
to speed the necessary long-term transformations.
In developing the rationale for a comprehensive, global system of accounting 
for nuclear materials; envisaging how such a system would function; and laying 
out the near-term steps states could take to begin moving in this direction, 
this study addresses several issues. Section Two summarizes changes in the 
international security environment since MC&A systems were rst developed 
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and describes the set of priorities that these systems will need to address during 
the coming decades in order to support nuclear risk-reduction eorts. Sections 
ree and Four provide background about the development and requirements of 
current MC&A systems, including international, regional, and national systems. 
Section Five describes how states could begin to develop a comprehensive system 
of nuclear material accounting that includes all designated nuclear materials and 
provides increased international condence in national managerial practices. 
Section Six summarizes what states can do to begin to improve nuclear material 
accounting capabilities today. 
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Section 2.
A 21st century approach to nuclear material accounting 
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons, their attendant production complexes, and the alliance structures that developed around them were most oen justied as a means to deter the use of nuclear weapons 
by others. In other words, nuclear weapons were an asset in an uncertain and 
dangerous world. In this context, reducing risks involved maintaining managerial 
control of weapons stockpiles and ensuring that states didn’t inadvertently launch 
nuclear attacks. 
With the end of the Cold War, the net value of nuclear weapons has decreased 
signicantly. Nuclear weapons are nancially costly to maintain and secure, 
and they have less military value than they previously did. is is why the 
states with the most nuclear weapons—the United States and Russia—have 
signicantly reduced their nuclear weapons stockpiles during the last 20 years, 
and why the United Kingdom and France have reduced their stockpiles as well. 
In other words, these states are reducing 
the liabilities that nuclear weapons present, 
even as they continue to enjoy whatever 
residual benets they oer. Other states, 
most notably Pakistan and India, have 
continued to develop their nuclear weapons 
stockpiles and capabilities, but these states 
have considerably fewer weapons and 
considerably smaller stockpiles of materials 
than the United States and Russia. 
e nuclear nonproliferation regime 
that developed alongside nuclear weapons 
arsenals and deterrence strategies has focused 
on a separate goal: keeping states that 
didn’t already have nuclear weapons from 
developing them, and providing assurances 
to all states that peaceful nuclear activities, 
including the development and use of nuclear 
energy, remained peaceful. Under this 
regime aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear 
Enhanced nuclear material control 
and accounting capabilities can 
help to: 
•	 ensure the nonproliferation 
of all nuclear materials and 
technologies in all countries 
to state-level nuclear weapons 
programs; 
•	 restrict non-state actor access to 
nuclear materials and technolo-
gies in all countries; 
•	 enable nuclear weapons states 
to reduce their nuclear arsenals 
in a manner that doesn’t intro-
duce instability; and 
•	 provide states with the systems 
and tools to continuously main-
tain condence that all of these 
risks are being appropriately 
addressed.
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weapons proliferation, states that possessed nuclear materials saw them as assets 
to develop economically and technologically, but others worried about the risk 
that non-weapons states with nuclear infrastructures and certain types of nuclear 
materials could use them to develop nuclear weapons. 
To manage these proliferation risks, the international community developed 
institutions—namely, the IAEA—and detailed management practices—namely, 
IAEA safeguards—that provided assurances to all states. ese practices have been 
strengthened over time and continue to evolve to address the risk of state-level 
weapons proliferation.1
States with nuclear weapons didn’t develop ways to provide this type of 
international assurance about the managerial control exercised over their 
stockpiles of weapons and materials or the composition and status of these 
stockpiles. Indeed, states with nuclear weapons generally kept information secret 
about their nuclear production complexes; the amounts, types, and statuses 
of materials they produced and stockpiled; and the operational practices they 
employed to manage their materials and warheads. ese secretive practices were 
accepted in part because these countries already possessed nuclear weapons, and 
their nuclear development activities were focused on preserving deterrence.
e risk of state diversion from civilian nuclear programs to nuclear weapons 
acquisition remains an important concern for the nonproliferation regime today, 
but the risk that nuclear materials in all states could also be diverted to non-
state actors has emerged as an additional priority. Instances of dangerously lax 
nuclear material security measures and nuclear material smuggling have been well 
documented, as has been the stated intent of non-state organizations to acquire 
nuclear materials and develop nuclear weapons.2 Concern about individuals with 
ocial access to nuclear materials using their access to divert materials, the so-
called insider threat, has also risen.
e current goal of IAEA safeguards is “the timely detection” of state 
diversion of nuclear materials and “deterrence of such diversion by the risk of 
early detection.”3 Can IAEA safeguards be expanded to better ensure the timely 
detection of non-state diversion of materials and the deterrence of such diversion 
1  IAEA, “e Evolution of IAEA Safeguards,” IAEA International Nuclear Verication Series 2, 1998.
2 e IAEA maintains a list of incidents involving unauthorized access to nuclear materials. See also 
Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2010 (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the 
Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear reat Initiative, April 2010), which is one of many publicly available 
reports that document and characterize the threat of nuclear terrorism.
3 IAEA, “e Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connec-
tion with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/153 (corrected), June 1972.
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by the risk of early detection?4 Reevaluating and expanding IAEA safeguards 
would not be a trivial process, but the tools and practices of traditional safeguards, 
including MC&A, are capable of bearing this additional burden by, for example, 
ensuring stronger national regulatory structures, requiring more frequent and 
timely material inventorying and reporting, and extending certain material 
accounting requirements to less attractive materials. 
e larger challenge is confronting the risks posed by nuclear weapons states’ 
sizeable civilian and military-use stockpiles of nuclear materials and their weapons 
arsenals. Most of these materials and all of these weapons remain outside of 
regular international oversight. Domestic regulators and policy makers oversee 
these material and warhead stockpiles, but the full extent of the risks associated 
with their current maintenance is uncertain. For example, some nuclear weapons 
states don’t know how much nuclear material they have with an acceptable 
level of certainty; some materials have not been properly characterized; and 
communication about the status and whereabouts of materials from the facility 
level to national authorities is infrequent and oen short on detail. 
At a minimum, the lack of transparency and accountability in managing the 
large materials stockpiles in civilian and military use and storage in these countries 
provides little to no international assurance about how materials are used and 
secured. Opportunities are lost to make clear to friends and potential adversaries 
alike the full nature of national capabilities and practices—and avoid unwarranted 
suspicions and undesired conicts. e practices of weapons states also obscure 
the risk of non-state diversion or the. Without additional oversight, the risk also 
remains that some of these materials could be moved back into existing state-level 
weapons programs. 
As nuclear weapons states seek to reduce their nuclear arsenals further, the large 
stockpiles of remaining warheads (including operational and reserve warheads, 
and those awaiting dismantlement) and the lack of transparency about their 
security, status, etc. potentially undermine these eorts.5 is lack of transparency 
ultimately limits how low nuclear weapons states can reduce their weapons 
arsenals and how they move toward the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.
e basic tools and processes of MC&A hold the potential to play a signicant 
role in reducing many of the present-day risks posed by nuclear materials in 
4 Martha Williams, “On the Importance of MC&A to Nuclear Security,” CISSM Working Paper, February 
2014.
5 For instance, none of the nuclear weapons reduction treaties ratied by the United States and Russia, 
including the most recent accord, New START, contain limits on total stockpiles of nuclear warheads, including 
reserve warheads or those awaiting dismantlement.
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weapons states, as well as in non-weapons states.6 MC&A is only a single piece of 
the broader eort to ensure nonproliferation and nuclear security—other essential 
parts include physical security, personnel reliability, etc.—but it is the linchpin 
of the daily management of nuclear materials, and its mechanisms enable the 
most detailed understanding of materials’ characteristics and whereabouts. Put 
another way, MC&A is the nervous system of the nonproliferation and nuclear 
security corpus. Indeed, MC&A capabilities are what enable nuclear operators 
and regulators to adequately address one of the most important questions that 
confronts policy makers in both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons 
states: “Are nuclear materials missing?” 
Strengthened IAEA MC&A requirements could help to ensure that nuclear 
materials in non-weapons states are not diverted to either state-level weapons 
programs or non-state actors. For all states to be assured that materials and 
warheads in nuclear weapons states are not at risk of non-state diversion, these 
states will have to submit their stockpiles of materials (both civilian and military) 
and their management practices to additional oversight. Such oversight will 
inevitably involve the use of MC&A systems to gather information about nuclear 
materials and a system by which at least some of that information is then shared 
either with an international authority or directly with other states. 
e process of drawing down nuclear weapons stockpiles also stands to benet 
from expanded MC&A capabilities. As they decrease their nuclear weapons 
stockpiles, nuclear weapons states will want to maintain condence that other 
weapons states are complying with their arms reduction commitments. ey will 
also want to be sure that those weapons states’ latent weapons capabilities—in 
the form of reserve or retired warheads, or signicant quantities of weapons-
usable materials—remain latent. Achieving these objectives will require access to 
information about the status and location of certain forms of nuclear material and 
warheads, and condence in the daily management practices of the operators of 
facilities with warheads and weapons-usable nuclear materials. 
Since the end of the Cold War, a few nuclear weapons states have introduced 
some transparency into their nuclear material and warhead holdings. By providing 
information about historical production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
and plutonium and about the disposition and use of those materials over time, 
the United States and the United Kingdom have cracked open the door to their 
otherwise protected and opaque nuclear complexes and capabilities. Yet the role 
6 Robert Elwood and Charles Roche, “Insider reat: Material Control & Accountability Mitigation,” 10th 
Central Asia MC&A Conference, Astana, Kazakhstan, January 2011. See also, IAEA, “Preventive and Protective 
Measures Against Insider reats,” IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 8, Implementing Guide, 2008.
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of these disclosures in addressing the nuclear risks identied in this paper is 
ultimately limited. ey could help identify the scope of risk, but such general 
disclosures provide little detail about the present-day distribution of these 
materials, how they are being used, and how they are being managed. Done 
inadequately, these eorts at transparency and condence building raise more 
questions than they answer.7
Policy makers from across the globe have recognized the potential importance 
of MC&A to addressing concerns about the diversion or the of nuclear materials 
to non-state actors, but the emphasis of current initiatives has been on necessary 
improvements to national laws and regulations—and primarily in states without 
nuclear weapons.8 Best practices have been devised and technical cooperation 
programs launched, but states have yet to develop comprehensive requirements 
that are capable of addressing the full scope of nuclear risks and that are meant to 
be adopted by all states.9
e nature of current nuclear risk reduction eorts, primarily arranged on 
implicit and explicit bargains between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear 
weapons states, suggests that the development of a comprehensive nuclear material 
accounting system will ultimately necessitate the participation of all states with 
nuclear materials. Perceptions of discrimination and the failure of nuclear weapons 
states to fulll their nuclear disarmament commitments under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) make it unlikely that non-weapons states will submit 
to additional MC&A requirements unless weapons states also agree to submit 
to additional requirements. Much as information exchanges have been a part of 
7 A May 2010 U.S. press release noted that the U.S. stockpile “consisted of 5,113 warheads,” a number 
that included active warheads that were deployed on weapon systems; “responsive” warheads that could be 
deployed on short notice and serve as a strategic hedge; and inactive warheads, which have had their  
limited-lifetime components removed but are otherwise intact and stored at Department of Defense instal-
lations. A subsequent State Department release noted that, as of December 2009, 1,968 of this total were 
deployed strategic weapons. Of the remaining 3,145 weapons, it was unknown precisely how many were 
included in the “responsive” force, which could be deployed on short notice, and how many were inactive. 
Ocials were also vague in describing that “several thousand additional nuclear weapons are currently 
retired and awaiting dismantlement.” ese ambiguities can cause suspicion among U.S. adversaries and 
partners alike.
8  U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 requires all states to “develop and maintain appropriate eective 
measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage, or transport.” e communiqué from 
the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit recognizes that “highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium require 
special precautions and [we] agree to promote measures to secure, account for, and consolidate these materials, 
as appropriate.” e statement of principles from the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism implores its 
members to “develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control and physical protection systems for nuclear 
and other radioactive materials and substances.”
9  For instance, see: World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), “Material Control and Accountancy in 
Support of Nuclear Security,” WINS International Best Practice Guide, Revision 1.0.
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nuclear weapons reduction agreements to date, nuclear weapons states will likely 
require additional, more detailed information sharing as part of nuclear weapons 
reductions agreements that address warhead numbers and material stockpiles. 
In order to get assurance from non-nuclear weapons states and other nuclear 
weapons states in the risk-reduction enterprise, nuclear weapons states will be 
obliged to give assurance in the form of information and access. is will be a 
signicant challenge, as these states have historically not been asked to submit 
their nuclear enterprises to the type of oversight that non-nuclear weapons states 
have. But in order to function as intended and to genuinely reduce the broad range 
of nuclear risks, a comprehensive, global nuclear material accounting system will 
need to operate on equitable rules that are applied fairly.
Arrangements that set comprehensive national MC&A requirements for 
all states and are accompanied by mechanisms for the international sharing of 
information would likely take years, if not decades, to gain the condence of 
their participants. States will never be able to have complete condence in such 
arrangements, but if such a system were developed in coordination among states 
and allowed to operate over the course of years, condence could grow to levels 
that would support the goal of deep cuts to nuclear weapons arsenals or the 
elimination of nuclear weapons. Absent these types of international arrangements, 
states could still benet from improvements in national-level systems that enable 
them to continuously account for all nuclear materials within their borders. is 
level of awareness and accountability is also liable to have international benets 
and provide a level of assurance to international partners.
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Section 3.
The development of nuclear material control and accounting 
From the outset of the nuclear age, national governments with stockpiles of nuclear materials recognized the need to account for them. One of the primary initial motivations was nancial, as states poured billions of 
dollars into developing and operating the facilities necessary to produce certain 
nuclear materials. But states also understood the intrinsic proliferation and safety 
risks associated with certain nuclear materials, and material accounting played a 
major role in guarding against the potential misuse of or an inadvertent accident 
involving nuclear materials. e processes and tools used in these early material 
accounting systems laid the groundwork for material accounting practices that are 
used today. 
Early U.S. nuclear material management systems were intended to be able 
to answer a number of questions about nuclear material holdings: How much 
material is there? Where is it? What form is it in? How accurate is the knowledge 
of the quantities? What is the monetary value? Has any blending occurred?10 ese 
systems focused almost exclusively on internal, national objectives. Government 
and commercial entities had interests in managing materials with high monetary 
value and in complying with national safety regulations. During this early period, 
there was little eort to use nuclear material accounting or other aspects of nuclear 
material management to directly address international security concerns.
e passage of the 1954 U.S. Atomic Energy Act; eorts by the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and other countries to export nuclear technology and materials 
abroad; and the founding of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957 
began the process of repositioning nuclear material accounting practices in the 
context of international security eorts. e United States and Soviet Union were 
keen to share the benets of nuclear energy with the world and wield nuclear 
energy as a tool of inuence. ey were also eager to ensure that materials and 
technologies they made available to other countries for peaceful purposes were 
not used to develop nuclear weapons. e founding IAEA statute, for instance, 
prioritized the application of “safeguards designed to ensure that special ssionable 
and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available 
10 D. F. Musser, “Philosophical and Practical Basis,” in Ralph Lumb, ed., Management of Nuclear Materials 
(Princeton, NJ: Nostrand Company, 1960), p. 7. Musser was the director of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commis-
sion’s Division of Nuclear Materials Management.
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by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used 
in such a way as to further any military purpose.” ese priorities necessitated 
the further development and wider application of nuclear material accounting 
requirements and practices.
In the process of developing the IAEA’s founding statute, some states pushed 
back against the idea of applying safeguards, including material accounting, 
to certain types of nuclear materials, particularly source materials, and for 
The ABCs of nuclear material accounting 
The concept of nuclear material accounting was based on the principles of nancial account-
ing. These principles have persisted, and nuclear material accounting systems today share 
many of the same basic features. The IAEA’s “Nuclear Material Accounting Handbook” and its 
report on the evolution of IAEA safeguards outline the basics of these traditional methods, 
elements of which are summarized below.
In order to account for nuclear materials, a facility establishes material balance areas or 
MBAs, discrete physical areas within which material accounting occurs. A facility can have mul-
tiple MBAs or only one; an entire facility or only a small part of one can comprise an MBA. Facil-
ity operators maintain records of how much of what kind of nuclear material is introduced into 
a specic balance area and also any changes in the inventory of materials within a specic 
balance area. When materials enter or leave a material balance area, they are typically subject 
to measurement at a key measurement point (KMP), where the quantity and composition 
of the material are noted within a specied level of uncertainty. Records of initial inventories 
and inventory changes make up the book inventory of a balance area—how much material 
should be in a given location at any given time. 
At prescribed frequencies, facility operators conduct physical inventories, where they measure 
some or all of the materials within a balance area and generate a physical inventory listing 
(PIL), which notes how much material actually is in a given location. A PIL is used to construct 
a material balance report, which details the initial inventory in a particular balance area, any 
changes in inventory over the given material balance period, the book and physical invento-
ries at the end of the period, and the inventory dierence—the dierence between the book 
and physical inventories. 
Nuclear material accounting records typically reect the amount and types of materials pres-
ent in a material balance area, but they can also reect the accounting of specic items within 
a balance area. Item-level accounting keeps track of discrete quantities or containers of 
materials that are not undergoing processing, have a measured element and isotope quantity, 
and have been assigned a unique indentier. When states submit nuclear material accounting 
reports to the IAEA, they do so in terms of batches, portions of nuclear material, each handled 
as a single unit, for which “the composition and quantity are dened by a single set of speci-
cations or measurements.” A batch can include bulk materials or items and might only include 
a single item.
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the duration of their lifetimes. ey believed that this practice would favor 
states with natural uranium deposits and would lead to the involvement of the 
IAEA in sovereign aairs in perpetuity.11 Concerns have continued to this day 
about preserving sovereign rights; the impact of safeguards on the economic 
competitiveness of commercial mining, processing, and fuel fabrication entities; 
and the equitable treatment of all states. As such, most states remain unwilling 
to share more nuclear material accounting information with the IAEA or other 
parties than they are required to, and many national and commercial operators 
remain resistant to what they view as interference in operational practices. 
erefore, information that could benet security, nonproliferation, or nuclear 
weapons reduction objectives goes uncollected or unreported.
e entry into force of the NPT in 1970 had a profound eect on the 
development of MC&A systems. e treaty requires that all non-nuclear weapons 
states parties develop comprehensive safeguards “with a view to preventing 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices.”12 A major component of these safeguards is the 
development of a state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material 
(SSAC), which is intended to allow a state to account for all safeguarded nuclear 
materials within its borders and to enable the state to report information about 
its nuclear materials to the IAEA.13 e IAEA then uses this information to verify 
state compliance with its safeguard commitments, and to detect and deter a 
diversion of a signicant quantity of material before it can be made into a weapon. 
Rather than specifying exactly how an SSAC should be set up, the IAEA only 
species the type of information that an SSAC should collect and the reporting 
requirements that a state needs to meet. As a consequence of the IAEA’s focus on 
SSAC capabilities and of the variety in states’ nuclear-related activities, nuclear 
material accounting systems and capabilities have developed dierently in 
dierent countries. States that have a multitude of facilities with nuclear materials 
oen have facility-level nuclear material control and accounting systems that feed 
information into a broader, national-level system. ese facility-level systems 
can serve multiple purposes. ey can allow a state to meet its IAEA safeguard 
11 David Fischer, A History of the IAEA: e First 40 Years (Vienna: IAEA Division of Publications, 
1997), p. 48.
12 See Article III of “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” e treaty is reproduced in 
IAEA INFCIRC/140, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Notication of Entry into 
Force,” April 22, 1970.
13  IAEA, “e Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connec-
tion with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/153 (corrected), June 1972, 
paragraph 7.
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commitments, but they can also help a facility ensure compliance with national 
or regional nuclear safety and security regulations. In states with only a handful 
of facilities containing nuclear materials or a limited range of activities, or in 
states where national regulations are limited, the SSAC’s sole function is to help 
that state meet IAEA material accounting and reporting requirements for all 
IAEA safeguarded materials. Despite the dierences in SSACs, IAEA safeguards 
agreements contain the most widely adhered to MC&A requirements. 
In the process of negotiating and ratifying the NPT, a few of the states that 
were categorized as nuclear weapons states under the terms of the treaty agreed to 
make available for safeguards many of their civilian nuclear facilities and materials 
under voluntary oer safeguards agreements. IAEA safeguards were intended to 
detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful purposes—not 
an immediate concern about those states that had already developed nuclear 
weapons. Yet, the oer was meant in part to assuage concerns that commercial 
interests in nuclear weapons states would benet economically from the absence 
of IAEA safeguards and in part to address the sense among some non-nuclear 
weapons states that they were being discriminated against with the application 
of safeguards. Putting some of the most advanced nuclear fuel cycle facilities in 
these states under safeguards would also help the IAEA develop its safeguard 
capacities.14
While most non-nuclear weapons states developed national nuclear material 
accounting systems—SSACs—with the explicit purpose of meeting IAEA 
safeguards requirements, weapons states developed their national systems 
independently and according to their own national requirements; these 
systems were then adapted as necessary to fulll their limited IAEA safeguards 
commitments. As such, there is great variety among nuclear weapons states 
in the requirements placed on civilian facilities with nuclear materials and on 
national systems that gather this information. And nuclear weapons states have all 
maintained separate and distinct accounting and management systems for nuclear 
materials assigned to military use, including nuclear warheads. 
MC&A-related technological capabilities
In meeting their material control and accounting requirements, states (non-weapon 
states and weapon states) employ a range of technologies without which MC&A 
capabilities would be severely limited. As MC&A technologies have advanced, they’ve 
enabled facilities to implement capabilities with greater eciency than before.
14 David Fischer, A History of the IAEA: e First 40 Years, p. 96.
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Measurement capabilities. Central to any MC&A system is the ability 
to measure material—its mass, density, isotopic composition, and other 
characteristics. Without accurate measurements of materials, it is dicult to have 
an accurate accounting of materials. When a material balance area accepts new 
materials, the rst step an operator takes is to measure the new materials. is 
process permits the operators to verify that the materials are what the transferrer/
shipper says they are and to rule out the possibility that materials were diverted or 
lost in transit. ese initial measurements also serve as the basis for future material 
balance calculations. If these initial measurements are inaccurate or contain too 
much uncertainty, then it will be dicult to reconcile future physical inventories 
with accounting records.
Fortunately, nuclear material measurement capabilities have steadily 
improved over time. One good indication of this change is the improvement of 
international standards for measuring nuclear materials. Starting in 1991, the 
IAEA developed a set of International Target Values (ITVs) that established a 
standard of measurement uncertainties for a range of material types, processes, 
and measurement technologies. ese target values did not reect the capabilities 
of the most sophisticated and advanced measurement systems at the time, nor 
did they assume that measurements were being taken under ideal circumstances; 
instead, they reected the “measurement performance observed in the IAEA’s 
verication activities.”15 In other words, the ITVs reected the accuracy and 
uncertainties inherent in measurement systems in operational settings. Today, 
IAEA ITVs are used by facilities containing nuclear materials all around the world 
as the benchmark for their own material measurement capabilities.
When released in 1993, the initial set of ITVs reected “an improvement by 
a factor 2 to 2.5 [sic] in the accuracy achievable in practice in the analysis of 
uranium products and spent fuel solutions” over standards set only ve years 
earlier.16 Subsequent versions of the IAEA ITVs include standards for additional 
types of measurement technologies and demonstrate further improvement in 
measurement performance for certain types of materials and processes. For 
example, the 2010 ITVs demonstrate a marked improvement over standards from 
2000 in the ability of operators to measure the abundance of U-235 (the ssile 
isotope of uranium) in uranium hexauoride using portable detectors and multi-
channel analyzers—among the most common non-destructive measurement tools 
15  S. Deron, E. Kuhn, M. Yousif, “International Target Values for the Quality of Measurements for Safe-
guards,” ESARDA Bulletin, no. 23, 1994, p. 459.
16 Ibid.
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at facilities with these types of nuclear materials.17 And measurement uncertainties 
continue to be the lowest for the most attractive forms of materials, such as HEU 
in metal or alloy form. e target uncertainty values associated with the non-
destructive measurement systems used for these forms of uranium and separated 
plutonium oxide are about 1 percent; for destructive measurement systems the 
uncertainty is less than .1 percent.18
In general, the more nuclear processes conducted and the more forms of 
nuclear materials present at a facility, the more types of measurement technologies 
will be needed to support material control and accounting operations. Materials 
“in process”—e.g., in enrichment centrifuges, being fabricated into fuel pellets, 
or in a dissolving tank—generally pose the greatest measurement uncertainties 
because they are oen very dicult if not impossible to physically measure. 
For this reason, operators have historically included a category of “in-process” 
materials when conducting physical inventories based on measurements.19 Under 
this practice an operator measures and inventories feed materials, intermediate 
and scrap materials, and outputs from processes—but not the actual in-process 
materials; this material is instead listed in the general category of “in process.” 
is practice, though still common, is being supplanted by attempts to develop 
technologies to more actively and accurately account for materials in process, 
without requiring their destruction.20
Process monitoring. e implementation of the measures developed in the 
early 1980s as part of the Hexapartite Safeguards Project—an eort involving the 
IAEA and a handful of nuclear supplier nations—began increasing safeguards 
at uranium enrichment facilities, including more frequent physical inventories 
and some in-process measurements. e most recent updates to the IAEA 
safeguards approach at enrichment plants involve even more process monitoring 
techniques, including actively monitoring the ow of uranium hexauoride, 
using load cells to measure the amount of feed material and waste that enters and 
exits a centrifuge cascade, and continuously monitoring the enrichment levels of 
17  IAEA Department of Safeguards, “International Target Values 2010 for Measurement Uncertainties in 
Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” STR-368, November 2010.
18 Ibid. Bulk sampling uncertainties add to the overall uncertainty of measurements.
19 James Lovett, Nuclear Materials: Accountability, Management, Safeguards (American Nuclear Society, 
1974), p. 85.
20 Joseph F. Pilat, “IAEA Safeguards: e Role of Advanced Safeguards Technologies in Meeting 
Tomorrow’s Challenges,” LA-UR-07-7848, November 2007. is paper was rst presented at the JAEA-
IAEA Workshop on Advanced Safeguards Technology for the Future Nuclear Fuel Cycle held in Novem-
ber 2007.
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materials in cascades.21 e IAEA believes that these tools, coupled with innovative 
information management systems, “will yield a clear picture of the U-235 and 
U-total nuclear material balance for the whole [enrichment] facility.”22 If these 
tools can be set up to function unattended, this stream of material accounting 
information can be continuously available.23
Similar eorts have aimed to integrate process monitoring techniques into spent 
fuel reprocessing plants. Near-real-time materials accountancy at reprocessing 
facilities involves measuring material streams with non-destructive tools and 
coupling this information with analytical models of the process to obtain accurate 
inventory dierences for the nuclear materials involved, including plutonium.24
Such systems have been developed for facilities that rely on a range of reprocessing 
techniques with the goals of not only providing a more continuous stream of 
material accounting data, but also of reducing the costs associated with plant 
shutdowns that are oen required to complete physical inventories of materials at 
these facilities.
Containment and surveillance. e IAEA employs containment and 
surveillance tools at facilities with nuclear materials to supplement material 
accounting practices by “providing means by which access to nuclear material can 
be controlled and any undeclared movement of nuclear material detected.”25 e 
most common IAEA surveillance tools are specially designed and tested video 
cameras that monitor, for example, key measurement points, entrances and exits 
to enclosures, and the materials themselves. ese monitoring systems are capable 
of maintaining continuous, 24-hour vigilance over an area, so that, for instance, all 
movements of materials in and out of a monitored area are recorded. 
e tools of containment include seals that are applied to containers with 
nuclear materials inside. e seals are designed and implemented so that operators 
and third parties are able to determine if they have been tampered with and 
21 C. Charlier, et al., “Conceptual Approach for Applying Safeguards at a Large Gas Centrifuge Enrich-
ment Plant,” Japan-IAEA Workshop on Advanced Safeguards Technology for the Future Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 
Tokai-mura, Japan, November 2009. See also: J. M. Whitaker, et al., “Using Process Load Cell Information for 
IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants,” paper presented at the 2010 IAEA Safeguards Symposium, IAEA-
CN-184/116.
22 C. Charlier, et al., “Conceptual Approach for Applying Safeguards.”
23 L. Eric Smith, et al., “Potential Roles for Unattended Safeguards Instrumentation at Centri-
fuge Enrichment Plants,” Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, vol. 42, no. 1 (Fall 2013), pp. 
38-56.
24  Steve M. Brion, et al., “e Commercial Application of Near Real Time Accountancy,” paper presented at 
2001 IAEA Safeguards Symposium, IAEA-SM-367/8/04/P.
25  IAEA, “Safeguards Techniques and Equipment,” International Nuclear Verication Series, No. 1 (Rev. 2), 
2011, p. 55.
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Eorts to improve material accounting 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and other nations have attempted to 
upgrade the MC&A capacities of other countries.
Starting in the early 1990s, the U.S. government began investing hundreds of millions of 
dollars in securing direct-use nuclear material (separated plutonium and highly enriched 
uranium) throughout the former Soviet states. A small part of this eort was aimed at 
improving the ability of Russia and other former Soviet states to account for their current 
holdings of nuclear materials. This included projects to improve Russia’s ability to accurately 
measure and characterize its nuclear material stockpiles, to maintain accurate and up-to-
date records of material holdings, to ensure that records reected physical inventories, and 
to enable stringent control of all direct-use materials, including discrete items. 
Other states were also involved in improving Russian MC&A capabilities. For instance, 
Swedish ocials worked with ocials at the Chepetsk Mechanical Plant, a uranium 
production and conversion facility, to install measurement and detection equipment. 
The Swedes are also prepared to install a new material accounting system at the facility, 
according to Swedish ocials, though Russian ocials are uncertain if they plan to keep 
this facility open.
Swedish authorities have also been involved in eorts to establish national nuclear 
material accounting systems in the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and 
Lithuania—and some facility-level systems at particular reactor sites. In large part, these 
eorts have involved installing material accounting systems that were initially developed 
and deployed in Western states to assist these states in fullling their IAEA safeguards 
obligations. This cooperation has boosted the material accounting capacity of these states, 
but because these systems were developed and have been maintained with Western 
support, sponsoring states have struggled to hand o responsibility for maintaining them 
to domestic authorities.
In 1994, the U.S. Department of Energy initiated a “lab-to-lab” program between U.S. 
and Chinese scientists aimed at boosting cooperation on nuclear arms control and 
nonproliferation. A main accomplishment of this eort was the joint demonstration 
of material protection, control and accounting technologies at a Chinese nuclear 
safeguards laboratory, which led to improvements in Chinese material accounting 
capabilities. Though the lab-to-lab program ended in 1998, the United States has since 
agreed to establish a center of excellence on nuclear security in collaboration with China, 
and will organize training and share best practices with Chinese nuclear technicians, 
including on MC&A. 
The IAEA maintains perhaps the most expansive eort to improve nuclear material 
control and accounting capabilities. It organizes training through its safeguards and 
nuclear safety and security departments for both IAEA member states and non-member 
states, and its technical cooperation department also focuses on providing assistance to 
states looking to address safety and security challenges.
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containers opened without authorization. ese tools are most oen employed to 
monitor materials that are in storage or not in use for months or years at a time. 
Other IAEA systems can continuously and remotely monitor the movements 
and measure the contents of individual items, such as fresh or spent fuel 
assemblies.26 ough these tools are not directly applicable to nuclear material 
accounting systems, they capture and transmit information that could be used 
to support a comprehensive nuclear material accounting system. Another 
surveillance tool that could be useful in this way is radiofrequency identication 
(RFID) tracking. Scientists have successfully pilot-tested systems in which RFID 
devices are attached to containers holding nuclear materials and tracked in real-
time during transport and storage.27 Although these tracking devices are not 
capable of continuously and accurately measuring the nuclear contents of such 
containers, if coupled with remotely monitored seals, they could provide some 
level of assurance to regulators or other states about the location and integrity of 
nuclear materials stored in containers.
26  Ibid., p. 42.
27  Yung Liu and James Shuler, “ARG-US RFID: Real-Time Tracking System,” presentation to INMM Interna-
tional Workshop, Containment and Surveillance: Concepts for the 21st Century, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, June 
7-11, 2010.
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Section 4.
Current requirements and capabilities
IAEA material accounting and reporting requirements
Under their safeguards commitments, NPT non-nuclear weapons states are 
required to meet certain material accounting standards and to report back to the 
IAEA with specic information about their nuclear materials. ese requirements 
are spelled out in the subsidiary arrangement that a state agrees to as part of its 
comprehensive safeguards agreement. Subsidiary arrangements vary from state to 
state, but the publicly available model subsidiary arrangement outlines the general 
requirements for SSACs and for the provision of information to the IAEA.28
According to the most recent version of the model subsidiary agreement, a 
state’s SSAC should be able to:
•	 measure the quantities of nuclear materials it receives, produces, ships, or 
otherwise removes from its inventory;
•	 evaluate the precision and accuracy of its measurements and estimate 
measurement uncertainties;
•	 conduct a physical inventory, whereby a part, a sample, or all material 
holdings are measured to compare against a book inventory;
•	 evaluate accumulations of unmeasured materials or unmeasured losses;
•	 identify and evaluate dierences in shipper/receiver measurements;
•	 maintain records that show, for each material balance area, the inventory of 
materials and the changes in that inventory;
•	 provide material accounting reports to the IAEA; and
•	 ensure that accounting procedures and arrangements operate as intended.
28  IAEA, “Subsidiary Arrangement to the Agreement Between the Government of […….] and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Fih Revision, SG-FM-1170, February, 22, 2011.
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e IAEA’s general requirements for SSACs leave much to the discretion of 
a member state. For instance, states are not required to maintain facility-level 
material accounting systems; they are not required to maintain computer-
based accounting systems; they don’t have to submit their reports to the IAEA 
electronically; and they can opt to submit information directly from facilities to 
the agency.
When a state agrees to a comprehensive safeguards agreement, it is expected 
to make an initial report to the IAEA that describes all nuclear material within 
its national boundaries “in peaceful nuclear activities” and all nuclear material 
in “peaceful non-nuclear activities, if it is recoverable or is directly usable for a 
nuclear activity.”29 In addition, as a state’s inventory changes—as it produces more 
materials that fall under safeguards, as materials move from material balance area 
to material balance area, etc.—that state is required to provide the IAEA with 
“inventory change reports” documenting these changes. Aer it takes physical 
inventories of materials, a state is also required to le with the agency a “material 
balance report,” which attempts to match the book inventory—the amounts 
of materials as reported in the material 
accounting system—with the physical 
inventory listing. 
ere is the potential for a considerable 
time lag between when inventory changes are 
made and when the IAEA requires reporting. 
e model subsidiary arrangement requires 
that states le inventory change reports “as 
soon as possible, but within 30 days aer 
the end of the month in which the inventory 
change(s) occur(s).” In theory, if an inventory 
changes in the rst week of a month, it 
could be nearly 60 days before that change 
is required to be reported to the IAEA. e 
same potential lag exists between a physical 
inventory taking and the ling of a material 
balance report to the agency. Here, states 
are required to le material balance reports 
with physical inventory listings “as soon 
29  is latter category of material refers primarily to nuclear materials that are used in industrial processes. e 
IAEA’s “Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,” 
IAEA Services Series 21, March 2012, spells out the many IAEA safeguards requirements of member states.
Materials not subject to IAEA 
detailed nuclear material 
accounting requirements
•	 All quantities of source materials 
(e.g., natural uranium, uranium 
ore concentrate, thorium) and 
other nuclear materials not “suit-
able for fuel fabrication or for 
being isotopically enriched.”
•	 Nuclear materials designated as 
“non-nuclear use” materials.
•	 Waste containing nuclear mate-
rial that is typically safeguarded 
but which is “diluted in such a 
way that it is no longer usable for 
any nuclear activity . . . or has be-
come practicably irrecoverable.”
•	 Nuclear materials exempted 
from safeguards.
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as possible, but within 30 days of completion of physical inventory taking.” e 
required frequency of physical inventories is not specied in the model subsidiary 
arrangement and likely varies depending on the type and form of material being 
accounted for.
A state is also required to prepare a special report for the IAEA in the event that 
a facility loses more than a specied limit of nuclear material or if any unusual 
incident or circumstance leads it to believe that “there is or may have been loss 
of nuclear material, including the occurrence of signicant delay during an 
international transfer.” e model subsidiary agreement requires these reports to 
be sent within 72 hours of a state reaching a specied loss limit and “immediately” 
aer an incident or circumstance is known.30
When a state or entity with an IAEA safeguards agreement transfers more 
than 1 kilogram of nuclear material to another country, it is required to notify the 
agency two weeks prior to shipment. A country receiving more than 1 kilogram 
of material is to notify the agency of receipt of that material “not later than seven 
days before the nuclear material is to be unpacked.” While the material is in 
transit, it is most oen on the books of the receiving state; thus there is a period 
during which the material is not on the books of the sending state and when it 
is not physically held by the recipient state. If a book or physical inventory were 
taken during this period, the material would appear on the recipient books but not 
be present in its physical inventory. 
ere are limits to the types and quantities of materials to which IAEA 
safeguards and detailed nuclear material accounting are applied. Nuclear 
materials not “suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched” 
are not subject to detailed nuclear material accounting; only import and export 
data about these materials is reported to the IAEA.31 While the IAEA “prefers to 
receive such information . . . within 30 days aer the import or export occurs,” 
states are only required to include this information in their annual report to the 
agency.32 e initial requirements for these types of materials excluded nuclear 
materials exported and imported for “non-nuclear uses,” such as when the aircra 
industry uses thorium as a counterweight. e Additional Protocol introduces 
30  IAEA, “Subsidiary Arrangement to the Agreement Between the Government of […….] and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”
31  ese types of materials include source materials, such as natural uranium, uranium ore concentrate, or 
thorium.
32  IAEA, “Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Proto-
cols,” p. 38.
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new thresholds for which import and export reporting is required for these “non-
nuclear use” materials: above 10 tonnes of uranium or 20 tonnes of thorium.
ough IAEA safeguards require import and export reporting on those 
materials not “suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched,” in 
practice, the IAEA doesn’t have the resources to match all of these import and 
export records.33 As a consequence, there is no way of knowing whether all exports 
of these materials reach their specied destination.
Other nuclear materials not subject to IAEA safeguards include nuclear waste 
in which material that is typically safeguarded has been “diluted in such a way 
that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity . . . or has become practicably 
irrecoverable.” States with Additional Protocols must provide information on 
changes “regarding the location or further processing of intermediate or high-level 
waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233 on which 
safeguards have been terminated,” but these materials, like the source materials 
noted above, are not subject to detailed material accounting. IAEA safeguards (and 
thus nuclear material accounting requirements) can also be exempted for relatively 
small quantities of nuclear materials, as long as the total amount of exempted 
material in a country does not exceed “one kilogram in total of special ssionable 
material” (a quantity that is determined by combining total plutonium with the 
U-235 content of both highly enriched and low-enriched uranium), 10 tonnes of 
natural or depleted uranium enriched to .5 percent U-235 or greater, 20 tonnes 
of depleted uranium enriched to .5 percent U-235 or below, and 20 tonnes of 
thorium. Should IAEA member states determine that any of these materials need 
to be subject to more detailed nuclear material accounting, then they would have 
to revisit model safeguards agreements requirements.
Material accounting and reporting requirements in nuclear weapons states
None of the ve states designated as nuclear weapons states under the NPT 
has comprehensive international nuclear material accounting and reporting 
requirements. Each of these states has negotiated a voluntary oer agreement 
with the IAEA that makes certain materials and facilities within their nuclear 
complexes available to nuclear safeguards, but due partly to IAEA resource 
constraints, very few materials and facilities in these states are subject to ongoing 
IAEA safeguards. For instance, during 2011 and 2012, only four U.S. facilities were 
selected for IAEA safeguards, and only one facility, the K-Area Material Storage 
33  Cindy Vestergaard, “Governing the (Very) Front-End of the Fuel Cycle,” presentation given at CISSM 
Workshop on Comprehensive Nuclear Material Accounting, October 18, 2013, Washington, D.C.
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(KAMS) at the Savannah River Site, was directly subject to IAEA oversight, 
and a majority of the inspections of this facility were done remotely. In China, 
materials at only three facilities (Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant, HTR-10 research 
reactor, and Shaanxi enrichment plant) were directly under IAEA safeguards.34 In 
total, the amount of material subject to IAEA safeguards and therefore detailed 
nuclear material accounting in nuclear weapons states represents a small fraction 
of the total nuclear material holdings of these countries—around 18 percent 
of separated plutonium and less than 1 percent of highly enriched uranium in 
these countries.35 Nuclear materials in NPT nuclear weapons states are subject 
to national safeguards, and these domestic systems include their own separate 
nuclear material control and accounting standards and reporting requirements. 
ese standards and requirements vary from state to state, but one commonality 
is that national nuclear material systems do not include detailed accounting of 
nuclear materials assigned to nuclear weapons use or nuclear materials assigned 
to military non-weapons use. Military authorities maintain separate accounting 
systems for these materials. 
Little is publicly known about the nuclear material accounting and reporting 
practices of the four states that possess nuclear weapons outside of the NPT: India, 
Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. Each of these states has (or had) a separate 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA that places (or placed) some of its nuclear 
materials and facilities under international safeguards and subjected them to IAEA 
material accounting and reporting requirements. But each of these countries (with 
the exception of North Korea) maintains more facilities and materials outside of 
IAEA safeguards than under them.
United States. e United States has maintained a national nuclear material 
accounting system since the passage of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. e ability of 
U.S. ocials to account for nuclear materials at U.S. civilian facilities has improved 
considerably since then. Currently, the most comprehensive U.S. nuclear materials 
accounting system is the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System 
(NMMSS), which is run out of the Department of Energy’s semiautonomous 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). All civilian U.S. facilities 
with nuclear material holdings provide accounting reports to NMMSS, and 
all generate these reports using their facility-level nuclear material accounting 
systems. (NMMSS also maintains aggregate information about nuclear materials 
34  e IAEA lists the facilities under IAEA safeguards in its annual reports.
35  ese estimates are based on IAEA statements about materials under IAEA voluntary oer agreements 
and International Panel on Fissile Material estimates of weapons states’ nuclear material holdings.
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assigned to military uses.) U.S. facility-level accounting systems are intended to 
meet standards and requirements set forth by either the Department of Energy or 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NRC regulations pertain primarily 
to nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel cycle facilities (including waste facilities), while 
Department of Energy regulations pertain primarily to U.S. research facilities and 
those facilities that work to develop and maintain nuclear weapons.36
Both NRC and Department of Energy material accounting requirements 
are graded, meaning that materials that could be more easily used in nuclear 
weapons are given extra scrutiny and require more frequent inventories on the 
facility level. But NMMSS, as a national system, sets the same requirements on 
accounting and reporting for all facilities with nuclear materials. Like IAEA 
safeguards requirements, NMMSS requires transaction reporting, physical 
inventorying, material balance reporting, etc., but NMMSS also accepts 
aggregate data on materials from some facilities, meaning that discrete items 
aren’t always accounted for separately. ere is also a lag between when a 
transaction occurs and when it is reported to NMMSS. NMMSS requires that 
“data on all transactions occurring during a calendar month is submitted no 
later than eight working days following the end of the month during which 
the transactions occurred.” It also requires that a facility that is shipping 
nuclear material to another facility report the transaction to NMMSS no more 
than one day aer the shipment. When a facility receives a shipment, it has 
10 days from the point of receipt to submit a transaction report to NMMSS. 
e same requirements are in place for domestic and international material 
transactions.37 NMMSS does not necessarily require a transaction report if a 
facility operator moves material from one material balance area to another 
within the same facility.38
NMMSS reconciles its nuclear material accounting records—based on 
transaction reports from a facility—with a facility’s material balance report, 
which is prepared aer a facility conducts a physical inventory. is reconciliation 
process is done at least annually for most facilities. And although the NMMSS 
user guide expresses a preference for electronic submission of material accounting 
reports from facilities, it also accepts “manual/paper” submission, and some 
36  See Department of Energy, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability,” DOE O474.2, approved June 
26, 2011; see also “Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material,” Code of Federal Regulations, 
Title 10 (NRC Regulations), Part 74.
37  Department of Energy, “Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System: User Guide-Rev. 2.0,” 
April 2013, p. 3-1.
38  Interviews with U.S. Department of Energy ocials and facility operators.
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facilities still fulll their reporting requirements this way.
One of the fundamental weaknesses of NMMSS, indeed of most national 
nuclear material accounting systems, is that it relies on facility operators 
to manually report material accounting data accurately and in a timely 
manner. e NRC and Department of Energy have processes in place to 
ensure compliance with facility-level nuclear material control and accounting 
requirements. But for a variety of reasons, facility operators don’t always comply 
with NMMSS reporting requirements in a timely fashion.39
China. Compared to other nuclear weapons states, China maintains much 
smaller stockpiles of nuclear materials. Prior to the 1980s, all facilities with nuclear 
materials were the sole purview of the Chinese military, which ensured control of 
the materials through methods of social control and worker loyalty.40 Under this 
system, materials were accounted for with a rudimentary, paper-based “ledger 
system.”41
China agreed to a voluntary oer safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1988, 
which ushered in the use of IAEA MC&A requirements and practices at some 
Chinese facilities. In 1990, China also issued a regulatory document, “Rules for the 
Implementation of the Regulations on Nuclear Materials Control,” which outlined 
the MC&A requirements that all facilities needed to meet in order to be licensed 
to use nuclear materials. e regulation and licensing of facilities with nuclear 
materials is currently managed through the Chinese Atomic Energy Authority’s 
Oce of Nuclear Material Control.
e 1990 rules require each facility to: assign personnel to be responsible for 
the custody of nuclear materials; establish accounting and reporting systems; 
measure materials as they enter a balance area and at the close of balance 
periods; and record internal and external transfers of materials.42 Facilities 
are required to conduct physical inventories of their nuclear materials at least 
annually, and at least twice annually for those materials containing plutonium 
239, uranium 233, and uranium 235 in concentrations greater than 20 percent.43
Operators are expected to record and analyze inventory dierences and regularly 
39  Interviews with U.S. Department of Energy ocials.
40  Hui Zhang, “Evaluating China’s MPC&A System,” paper presented at the INMM 44th Annual Meeting, 
Phoenix, Arizona, July 13-17, 2003.
41  Nathan Busch, “China’s Fissile Material Protection, Control, and Accounting: e Case for Renewed 
Collaboration,” e Nonproliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2002, p. 94.
42  Wu Jun, “e Regulation and Technology of Chinese Nuclear Material Accounting,” CISSM Working 
Paper, February 2014.
43 Ibid.
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assess the reliability of measurement systems.
With the assistance of the United States (see “Eorts to Improve Material 
Accounting,” p. 32) and the IAEA, China has been able to introduce computerized 
nuclear material accounting systems at many of its facilities. Yet there are questions 
about whether the adoption of these systems and the requirements stipulated in 
the 1990 rules are sucient to detect or prevent the diversion of nuclear materials 
by “insiders” and non-state actors.44 Similar questions remain about whether 
China has an accurate baseline accounting of nuclear materials on which to 
conduct accurate and complete material accounting.45
Russia. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s nuclear accounting eorts 
relied primarily on assigning personal responsibility for nuclear materials to 
facility operators and technicians.46 In other words, individuals working with 
nuclear materials were responsible for staying under targets for allowable losses of 
materials that were set for each type of activity that they conducted. As long as the  
amounts of materials, or records of material losses, were within limits of allowable 
losses, the material accounts were considered adequate. Rarely if ever did facility 
operators measure material stockpiles to determine inventory dierences based on 
empirical data.
e Soviet Union began to introduce a more conventional form of nuclear 
material accounting in the mid-1980s aer it signed a voluntary oer safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA.47 Two Russian facilities—a research reactor and a 
power reactor—developed MC&A systems that met IAEA requirements. e 
many other Russian facilities with nuclear materials didn’t begin to see this type of 
improvement in material accounting until the mid-1990s, when U.S. and Russian 
ocials initiated cooperative threat reduction projects within the former Soviet 
states. As part of these eorts, Russia instituted a range of new, more stringent 
national regulations aimed at governing the use of nuclear material.48 e 
44  Nathan Busch, “China’s Fissile Material Protection, Control and Accounting.” Busch sug-
gests, “It is [not] clear that China has undertaken the extensive designing and testing necessary 
to assemble MC&A equipment into an integrated system capable of detecting the thes of ssile 
materials.”
45 Ibid.
46  Alexander Rumyantsev, “State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and 
Radioactive Substances in Russia,” Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control), #15, March 1996. is article 
provides a broad overview of Soviet-era material accounting practices.
47  IAEA, “e Text of the Agreement of 21 February 1985 Between the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” 
INFCIRC/327, July 1985.
48  Dmitry Kovchegin, “Developing a Nuclear Material Control and Accounting System in Russia,” 
CISSM Working Paper, December 2013.
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most important for nuclear material accounting purposes was, “Basic Rules for 
Accounting for and Monitoring of Nuclear Materials.”49 is order doesn’t specify 
requirements for inventory change reporting, but it does require operators to 
conrm the characteristics of a nuclear material shipment and enter them into the 
facility-level material accounting system within 10 days of receiving the material. 
It also requires that physical inventories be conducted every two months for the 
most sensitive nuclear materials and at least once every 12 months for the least 
sensitive nuclear materials. 
Missing from Russian material accounting requirements was and is the 
requirement for an initial material accounting report from each facility that is 
based on measurements of material holdings. In many cases, Russian ocials have 
decided to accept as accurate Soviet material accounting records as the baseline 
for balancing material accounts.50 e lack of initial measurement-based physical 
inventories at many Russian facilities undercuts eorts to ensure the security of all 
materials at those facilities.
Along with the reform in regulations that came as part of the cooperative 
threat reduction program, U.S. ocials worked with Russian ocials to establish 
a new national nuclear material accounting system that could serve a role 
equivalent to that of IAEA SSACs or other weapons states’ national systems. e 
Federal Information System (FIS), as the Russian national system is known, was 
intended to include detailed information about all nuclear materials from all 
material balance areas at all civilian facilities. By 2000, however, Russian ocials 
conceded that this ambitious goal was impractical because it would be too costly 
economically.51 Instead of reporting material accounting information from 
every material balance area, a standard requirement under IAEA safeguards 
and most other national material accounting systems, the FIS adopted 
“organization-level” reporting, where many of the approximately 60 Russian 
civilian organizations would report on the aggregate material holdings of their 
entire system. Summaries of material inventories for an entire organization 
would be sent to the FIS once a year; summaries of all inventory changes within 
an organization would be reported quarterly. is standard proved insucient 
to the management team overseeing the FIS’s development: “e organization-
wide reports provided too little information to perform several dierent nuclear 
49  is regulation, best known by its Russian acronym, OPUK, has gone through several versions. 
e most recent version, NP-030-12, was adopted on April 17, 2012.
50  Dmitry Kovchegin, “Developing a Nuclear Material Control and Accounting System in Russia.”
51  Rusty Babcock, “U.S. and Russian Cooperation on the Russian Federal Information System (FIS),” 
presentation at NMMSS Users Annual Training Meeting, May 23-25, 2006, p. 7.
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material management tasks.”52
As an alternative, ocials decided to organize “reporting zones”—which 
could be made up of a single MBA, many MBAs, or an entire organization—and 
that these zones would regularly provide detailed accounts of material holdings 
to the FIS. According to Russian ocials, this shi would permit an increase in 
material accounting reporting as compared to organization-level reporting, but 
wouldn’t require as many inventory reports as would be required under a system 
that counted each MBA as a separate reporting unit. Under this scheme, referred 
to as the “universal reporting method,” the reporting zones with the most 
sensitive material would submit inventory listings and inventory change reports 
to the FIS monthly.53
France and the United Kingdom. Since 1973, when the European Atomic 
Energy Commission (Euratom) concluded a safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA, Euratom has served as a clearinghouse of nuclear material accounting 
information from members of the European Commission, including France 
and the United Kingdom. Euratom maintains its own material accounting 
database to which civilian nuclear facilities within Europe submit accounting 
reports on their nuclear material holdings. In most cases, this information is 
then passed along to the IAEA in fulllment of European states’ international 
safeguards commitments.
Euratom material accounting and reporting requirements are similar to those in 
the United States. Euratom safeguards are also graded for material attractiveness, 
and Euratom data collection relies on facility-level compliance. Euratom member 
countries are expected to maintain nuclear material accounting systems at all 
facilities that house nuclear materials, to set up material balance areas, to measure 
and characterize materials as they come and go, to report on transactions between 
material balance areas, to conduct regular physical inventories, and to reconcile 
dierences in book and physical inventories. Euratom also conducts site visits to 
verify both that material accounting systems are organized as required and that 
accounting records reect current holdings.
Each Euratom facility is expected to submit all transaction reports regarding 
materials entering or leaving each material balance together. According to 
Euratom regulations, these reports, “shall be sent monthly, at the latest 15 days 
52  A. Martiyanov, V. Pitel, L. Kasumova, R. Babcock, and C. Heinberg, “Proposals for the Future Devel-
opment of the Russian Automated Federal Information System for Nuclear Material Control and Account-
ing: e Universal Reporting Concept,” presentation at INMM Annual Meeting, June 24, 2004, UCRL-
CONF-204879.
53 Ibid.
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aer the end of the month, and shall state all inventory changes which have 
occurred or become known during that month.”54 Physical inventories are 
required at least once every calendar year and “the period between two successive 
physical inventory takings shall not exceed 14 months.”55 If a facility operator 
believes there has been an “unusual occurrence,” such as a loss of material, he 
or she is required to bring this loss to Euratom’s attention as soon as possible. 
Facilities are required to notify Euratom of exports of material to other states at 
least eight days “before the material is to be packed for transfer.” Facilities that 
receive shipments of material from foreign facilities must report the transaction 
by the date of receipt at the latest. When it revised its nuclear material accounting 
regulations in 2005, Euratom also developed a new streamlined electronic data 
transmission system. All Euratom facilities are expected, if possible, to use this 
system when transmitting accounting data to Euratom.
As NPT nuclear weapons states, France and the United Kingdom have a 
number of facilities and materials that are excluded from Euratom safeguards. 
ese military-related facilities and materials are subject to separate domestic 
accounting and reporting requirements.
Accounting for military-use nuclear materials 
Each of the ve NPT nuclear weapons states reserves a sizeable stockpile of 
nuclear materials for use in nuclear weapons or for other military purposes, 
including the fueling of nuclear-powered submarines. None of these states makes 
publicly available detailed information about how these military-use materials are 
accounted for on a daily basis. 
e Trilateral Initiative between the United States, Russia, and the IAEA 
attempted to begin the process of applying international safeguards to U.S. 
and Russian materials deemed in excess of military needs, but the initiative 
ended in 2002 when political leaders in each country decided that coordinated 
eorts had gone as far as they could and that each state ought to pursue further 
implementation of safeguards on excess military materials with the IAEA, and 
only the IAEA.56 e U.K.-Norway Initiative attempted to demonstrate the 
54  “Commission Regulation (Euratom) No. 302/2005 on the Application of Euratom Safeguards,” Ocial 
Journal of the European Union, February 8, 2005.
55  Ibid. Commission recommendations for the implementation of Regulation (Euratom) No. 302/2005 
specify particular requirements related to the submission of physical inventory listings and material balance 
reports that are compiled before the end of a month, so that these reports do not create inconsistencies when 
the data is reported to the IAEA.
56  omas E. Shea, “e Trilateral Initiative: A Model for the Future?,” Arms Control Today, May 2008.
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possibility of verifying nuclear warhead declarations and dismantlement, but it 
was a demonstration project and did not involve accounting for the materials 
assigned to operational or reserve warheads. Safeguards experts have explored 
yet other ways to extend IAEA safeguards to materials in nuclear weapons states, 
including materials designated for military use or in-excess of military use.57 Yet, 
these eorts have not made it o the drawing board, as nuclear weapons states, by 
and large, have yet to fully embrace the perceived benets of having more detailed 
accounting of other states’ nuclear material stockpiles and to prioritize bolstering 
IAEA capabilities. 
e United States and the United Kingdom have made public declarations 
that include information about the amount of weapons-usable nuclear materials 
currently held by their militaries.58 But these declarations provide only snapshots 
of material holdings and include little to no information about how these materials 
are accounted for and managed on a day-to-day basis. In accordance with arms 
control agreements, Russia and the United States have also shared with each 
other information about the number and location of operationally deployed 
strategic nuclear weapons; a subset of this information is also released publicly. 
However, these information exchanges are relatively infrequent, and they don’t 
address which nuclear materials are present in each warhead or in what quantities 
and composition. ese agreements also do not address non-deployed strategic 
warheads, tactical nuclear weapons, or reserve military stockpiles of weapons-
usable materials. 
e branches of the U.S. armed services that manage nuclear weapons and 
materials (the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy) have made publicly available 
some of their regulatory guides for nuclear material and warhead handling. ese 
documents describe the general requirements for the accounting and control 
of U.S. nuclear weapons, weapons assemblies, and some weapons-related items, 
and they provide a general sense of how some military-use nuclear materials are 
accounted for. 
Each nuclear weapon or item under the control of the U.S. Air Force, for 
instance, is assigned an account number, and a single munitions accountable 
systems ocer (MASO) is assigned responsibility for a set of items; this ocer 
57  For example, see John Carlson, “Expanding Safeguards in Nuclear-Weapons States,” presentation, 
2011 Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, July 17-21, 2011.
58  See Department of Energy, “Plutonium: e First 50 Years,” February 1996, DOE/DP-0137; Depart-
ment of Energy, “Highly Enriched Uranium Inventory,” January 2006; U.K. Ministry of Defence, “His-
torical Accounting for UK Defence Highly Enriched Uranium,” March 2006; U.K. Ministry of Defense, 
“Plutonium and Aldermaston: An Historical Account,” 2000.
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is “responsible for the accuracy of accountable records (manual or automated) 
generated within his/her area of responsibility.”59 e Department of Defense 
maintains the Defense Integration and Management of Nuclear Data Services 
(DIAMONDS) system, an “automated end-to-end information infrastructure” 
for managing its nuclear stockpile, including operational and non-operational 
nuclear warheads.60 e accountable ocer is required to document in 
DIAMONDS changes in the status of each item within his or her control, 
changes in the conguration of items, transfers of custody of items, and the 
shipment or receipt of items.61
Any time an accountable ocer is changed for a set of items, both the old and 
the new ocers are required to conduct a “100 percent [physical] inventory of 
the account.” A complete physical inventory is also required of the entire U.S. 
stockpile of nuclear weapons and weapons subassemblies at least semiannually; 
this semiannual process “creates an independent inventory that reports the status, 
location, and conguration of the national nuclear weapon stockpile by serial 
number and quantity for each location.” is independent semiannual inventory 
listing is then sent to DIAMONDS, where the Defense reat Reduction Agency, 
which maintains the system, reconciles the inventory with its most up-to-date 
records. Special “rapid” inventories can be requested by the president of the 
United States, secretary of defense, and the Joint Sta to “promptly verify all or 
selected portions of the DoD stockpile of nuclear weapons are in the possession 
of authorized DoD agents.”62 It is unclear if any of these inventories involve 
measuring and reporting the nuclear materials present in an item or whether they 
are simply exercises in counting items.
In the absence of detailed publicly available information about how 
they account for and control all military-use nuclear materials and nuclear 
warheads, the militaries of the ve NPT nuclear weapons states and the four 
additional nuclear weapons states have provided public assurances about how 
59  Department of the Air Force, “Nuclear Accountability Procedures,” Air Force Instruction 21-203, 
November 23, 2009. While this document outlines some accounting and control procedures, public 
access to other documents that presumably provide signicantly more detail about accounting for 
nuclear weapons and military-use materials—directives such as “11N-100-4 Custody, Accountability, 
and Control of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Material,” “11N-3150-8-1, USAF DIAMONDS Policy 
and Procedures,” and “11N-100-3150, Joint Reporting Structure: Nuclear Weapons Reports”—remains 
restricted. Previous iterations of some of these documents have been released publicly, though they are 
heavily redacted.
60  FBO Daily, DIAMONDS “sources sought” notice, December 15, 2002, FBO #0378.
61  Department of the Air Force, “Nuclear Accountability Procedures.”
62 Ibid.
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seriously they take the responsibility of accounting for and controlling these 
materials.63 is type of assurance might have suced in a world where the 
primary concerns of national and international ocials were the prevention of 
proliferation to non-weapons states and the preservation of strategic nuclear 
deterrence, but it is unlikely to suce under current security demands. Indeed, 
assurances about the level of national control of nuclear weapons and their 
components have been severely undermined by accounts of nuclear weapons 
states’ operational failures. 
For instance, Russian experts believe that as the Soviet Union began to fall 
apart in 1991, Russian ocials did not have complete control over nuclear 
weapons deployed to republics other than Russia. As one expert put it, 
“nuclear weapons quickly became hostage to political struggle between the 
governments of emerging independent states and Soviet leadership.64 While 
this lack of control was a problem, an even greater problem would have 
been if these weapons and the materials included in them would have been 
unaccounted or misaccounted for. Experts don’t know if this was ever the case, 
but it’s unclear if the Soviets even had the accounting infrastructure in place to 
know if this had occurred.
More recently, in 2007, U.S. pilots mistakenly ew six nuclear-armed cruise 
missiles from Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base. Neither the 
ocers at Minot or at Barksdale were aware for 36 hours that the nuclear 
weapons were transferred; in other words, whatever system that was used to 
manage those nuclear weapons failed to account for or control them in a timely 
manner. e mistake was noticed only when ocers at Barksdale ooaded 
the weapons. On two occasions a year earlier, in October and November 2006, 
the Air Force mistakenly shipped several forward-section assemblies of U.S. 
Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles to Taiwan. While this mistake 
did not involve a failure of accounting for nuclear material, it did involve highly 
sensitive weapons components—in this case, the part of the missile that holds 
63  For example, in his brieng about the 2007 mistaken transfer of 6 nuclear weapons from Minot Air 
Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base, Michael Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force, attempted to reassure 
the public about Air Force accounting and control of nuclear weapons thusly: “e American public has 
placed great trust and condence in its Air Force to safeguard our country’s strategic weapons. We have for 
the past 60 years and will continue to execute this important mission of providing security for all weapons.” 
Department of Defense, “DoD Press Brieng with Maj. Gen. Newton from the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.,” 
October 19, 2007.
64  Nikolai Sokov, “Controlling Soviet/Russian Nuclear Weapons in Time of Instability,” paper prepared for 
a Nonproliferation Policy Education Center meeting, “Securing Nuclear Arsenals for the Next Half Century: 
What Does History Recommend?” February 28, 2012.
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Inventory change and transaction 
reporting Physical inventory taking
IAEA  
Safeguards
Changes in material balance area 
inventories are required to be 
reported within 30 days after the 
end of the month in which change 
occurs. Reporting for international 
transactions is required two weeks  
prior to shipment and one week prior 
to unpacking a received shipment.
Varies by material type 









According to U.S. regulations, 
transaction data is required within 
eight days of the end of the month 
in which the transaction occurred. 
Reporting on inter-facility or 
international transfers is required 
within one day of material shipment 
and within 10 days of material receipt.
Varies from every two 
months to every two 
years for Department of 
Energy facilities and at least 
annually for NRC licensees.
Euratom 
Safeguards
Transaction data is required within 
15 days after the end of the month in 
which transaction occurs.
Required at least once 
every calendar year and not 






Transaction data is required within 10 
days of material receipt.
Required at least every two 
months for most sensitive 
materials and at least 
annually for other materials.




At the time of the change. Required when a new ocer 
assumes responsibility 
for items; complete 
inventory required at least 
semiannually.
Sources: IAEA, “Subsidiary Arrangement to the Agreement Between the Government of […….] and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Fih Revision, SG-FM-1170, February, 22, 2011; Department of 
Energy, “Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System: User Guide-Rev. 2.0,” April 2013; Russian 
Federation, “Adoption of the Federal Rules and Regulations Regarding the Use of Atomic Energy —Basic Nu-
clear Material Control and Accounting Rules,” Federal Environmental, Industrial, and Nuclear Regulatory Au-
thority Order № 255, April 17, 2012;  “Commission Regulation (Euratom) No. 302/2005 on the Application of 
Euratom Safeguards,” Ocial Journal of the European Union, February 8, 2005; Department of the Air Force, 
“Nuclear Accountability Procedures,” Air Force Instruction 21-203, November 23, 2009; and other sources.
Comparing international and national nuclear material accounting standards
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the nuclear warheads—that had previously been accounted for in a manner 
similar to how nuclear weapons with materials included are accounted for.
e Department of Defense conducted several reviews of the specic 
circumstances that led to these mistakes and of nuclear weapons handling 
procedures in general. One of the reviews, the Report of the Secretary of 
Defense Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management (otherwise known as the 
Schlesinger Report, aer the task force chairman, former defense and energy 
secretary James Schlesinger), pointed to changes that had been made in the mid-
1990s to the accounting procedures for nuclear weapons-related materials as a 
source for the errant shipments to Taiwan. As a part of military base consolidation 
and procedural “streamlining,” 12,000 nuclear weapons-related items—sensitive 
components that do not include nuclear materials—were transferred to “a system 
that managed them as regular commodities,” eectively eliminating “special 
material handling requirements.”65
In response to nding an “atrophy” of the Air Force’s nuclear mission, the 
task force recommended a review of all Air Force nuclear weapons handling 
procedures and endorsed Air Force eorts to elevate the accounting requirements 
for nuclear weapons-related items. e Air Force denes its goal as obtaining 
“positive inventory control” of all nuclear weapons-related items. is requires 
“the ability to identify and account for the condition and location of material 
anywhere in the supply chain, including storage, movement, maintenance, use, and 
disposal by a responsible agent at any point in time [emphasis added].”66 Indeed, 
the Department of Defense added a module to its DIAMONDS system for the 
explicit purpose of providing “tracking and accountability of Nuclear Weapons-
Related Materials.”67
Accounting for foreign-obligated materials
As states began to trade nuclear technology and material with other countries 
in the 1950s, they had to consider what material accounting requirements they 
would apply to these “foreign-obligated” materials. In most cases, particularly 
since the adoption of the NPT, states have relied on their trading partners’ or the 
IAEA’s ability to account for these nuclear materials. As most nuclear-exporting 
states limit trade of nuclear materials and technologies to other states with IAEA 
65  Department of Defense, “e Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons 
Management, Phase I: e Air Force’s Nuclear Mission,” September 2008, p. 24.
66  Ibid., p. 66.
67  e Department of Defense FY2011 Budget Request explains in greater detail the requirements for this 
additional DIAMONDS module.
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safeguards agreements, this ensures that these exported materials are at least 
subject to IAEA safeguards requirements.
In relying on other national or international material accounting systems, 
states give up direct knowledge of the whereabouts of the material they supplied 
and how the materials are being used. In the United States, this lack of knowledge 
has been perceived as reason for concern.68 While not having access to detailed 
material accounting information about foreign-obligated materials is not the 
same as those materials not being accounted for properly, there is reason for states 
to work toward greater and more predictable accounting of foreign-obligated 
materials. Without frequent access to information about where foreign-obligated 
materials are and what they are being used for, states forfeit the ability to ensure 
the application of safeguards and material accounting to all materials in those 
states. e IAEA and other regulatory bodies work to ensure a state’s compliance 
with safeguards commitments, but it is in the interests of supplier states to be able 
to exercise additional leverage to ensure compliance. is would require more 
frequent access to detailed nuclear material accounting information about foreign-
obligated materials. 
Achieving this objective would require reorienting the nature of nuclear 
cooperation to achieve both economic and security objectives.69 Applying 
additional material accounting requirements to nuclear trade could steer 
states seeking nuclear technology and material to suppliers with less stringent 
requirements. is is why it is important for all supplier states to work toward 
specic and consistent nuclear material accounting and reporting requirements for 
all of their nuclear cooperation agreements. Doing so would set a new baseline for 
commerce in nuclear materials above and beyond what organizations, such as the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, currently require. 
68  U.S. Government Accountability Oce, “Report to the Committee on Foreign Aairs, House of Rep-
resentatives: U.S. Agencies Have Limited Ability to Account for, Monitor, and Evaluate the Security of U.S. 
Nuclear Material Overseas,” GAO-11-920, September 2011.
69  Nickolas Roth and Jonas Siegel, “Improving Accounting and Reporting of Foreign-Obligated Nuclear 
Materials,” unpublished working paper, June 2013. 
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Section 5. 
Envisaging a comprehensive system 
Setting more stringent requirements and establishing new capabilities for the accounting and control of nuclear materials in all states requires a great deal of forethought. e systems currently in place have 
developed over time and reect the security, safety, and commercial concerns of 
governments, businesses, and international organizations. But it’s also because 
current systems and practices predominantly reect legacy arrangements, in 
response to outdated security concerns and economic conditions, that these 
requirements and operating capabilities need rethinking. 
e primary risk posed by nuclear materials today is not simply that non-
nuclear weapons states will divert materials to develop nuclear weapons, though 
this does remain a concern. Policy makers and security experts are equally, if not 
more, concerned about the diversion of nuclear materials to non-state entities, 
particularly as the use of nuclear energy and the international trade in nuclear 
materials expands. A third concern is ensuring international security as states 
decrease their nuclear weapons arsenals and adjust their nuclear postures. is is 
a considerably more complex and demanding set of priorities for nuclear material 
accounting and control systems and practices to serve. 
As the above summaries of national and international material accounting 
requirements demonstrate, current nuclear material accounting standards vary 
from country to country. ough many nuclear material accounting systems serve 
their stated purposes adequately, taken together they are ill equipped to address 
emerging nuclear security and nonproliferation objectives, as well as to support 
further nuclear weapons reductions. Put more directly, legacy systems are not as 
accurate or as timely as they could be made to be with reasonable adjustments.
To achieve expanded objectives, all states will have to employ comprehensive 
nuclear material accounting systems and practices that enable them to account 
for the most dangerous types of materials on a near-continuous basis and less 
dangerous material more frequently than they currently do. ey will also need 
to develop information systems that allow for the coordinated management of all 
accounting information about all nuclear materials within their national borders. 
And all states will need to subject their systems to international monitoring and 
transparency mechanisms, such that states will have condence in other states’ 
accounting and control of their materials. 
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In order to achieve these objectives, it is not necessary for material control 
and accounting systems to function identically in every state, but they all need 
to meet the same internationally agreed-upon requirements. e nature of 
past and current arrangements to reduce nuclear risks suggests that further 
risk reduction eorts will need to involve more equitable rules. Building such 
a comprehensive, global nuclear material accounting system will require 
international coordination and considerable political eort. For states to have 
condence in such a system—condence that the system permits them to assess 
other states’ compliance with their nuclear risk reduction commitments—the 
system will have to operate for a number of years and be rened to address 
emergent concerns. is section identies the components of a comprehensive 
nuclear material accounting system that will help states meet emerging global 
security objectives. 
Materials subject to comprehensive accounting
Nuclear material accounting requirements typically dier according to 
the attractiveness, quantity, and form of the materials being safeguarded. 
Requirements are graded in this way to reect the lower security risk that certain 
quantities and forms of materials present and also the nancial cost associated 
with accounting for materials. As accounting requirements for more attractive 
materials typically require more frequent physical inventories and sometimes more 
technologically advanced measurement and control mechanisms, they can be 
more time consuming and expensive to fulll. On the other hand, some attractive 
materials are relatively easy to account for because they are kept in item form and 
can be secured in containers and continuously monitored, while less attractive 
bulk materials can be more time-consuming to account for. 
Accounting for all nuclear materials—from HEU assigned to nuclear warheads 
to cylinders of uranium hexauoride—in the same stringent manner would likely 
lead to the misallocation of nite national government and commercial resources. 
Yet, requirements for each type and form of material can be improved and 
standardized across national borders to better address the risks identied in this 
study and the shortcomings of current systems. 
Special nuclear materials. While there are dierences in specic 
requirements, most national regulatory bodies and the IAEA agree on the basic 
types of materials that should be subject to detailed nuclear material accounting. 
ese materials include: plutonium 239, uranium 233, uranium enriched in 
the isotope 235, and any material containing one or more of these materials (to 
include nuclear waste). e IAEA terms this type of material “special ssionable 
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material,” the United States calls it “special nuclear material,” Euratom “special 
ssile material,” etc.70
e IAEA breaks down special ssionable material into two additional 
categories: direct-use material and indirect-use material. Direct-use special 
ssionable materials are those that can be used in a nuclear weapon “without 
transmutation or further enrichment.”71 is includes uranium enriched to 20 
percent or greater U-235, plutonium containing less than 80 percent Pu-238, and 
uranium 233. Indirect-use materials include all other special ssionable materials: 
low-enriched uranium, etc. is latter distinction is important because the IAEA 
sets dierent standards for detecting the diversion of direct- and indirect-use 
materials. At a minimum, it aims to detect the diversion of unirradiated direct-use 
materials (such as fresh HEU reactor fuel, separated plutonium, etc.) within one 
month of a diversion, while it aims to detect the diversion of irradiated direct-use 
materials (such as spent reactor fuel) within three months of diversion and all 
indirect-use material within one year of diversion.72
As part of a comprehensive nuclear material accounting system, direct-use 
special ssionable nuclear materials should be subject to the most stringent 
requirements. In a world with low numbers of nuclear weapons, the risk of a 
nuclear weapons state reconstituting a weapon or of a non-nuclear weapons state 
or non-state actor developing a weapon requires that all direct-use materials be 
subject to MC&A requirements similar if not the same to those used for intact 
nuclear weapons. 
e U.S. Department of Defense’s emphasis on positive inventory control 
of all nuclear weapons-related materials could serve as a minimum standard 
for all direct-use materials in both item and bulk form. As a reminder, positive 
inventory control requires “the ability to identify and account for the condition 
and location of material anywhere in the supply chain, including storage, 
movement, maintenance, use, and disposal by a responsible agent at any point 
in time.” Such a stringent requirement will necessitate signicant changes in 
how facility-level nuclear material accounting systems function (see below 
for a discussion of frequency of inventory change, transaction, and material 
balance reporting). 
Positive inventory control for nuclear materials classied as items is currently 
achievable given the evolution of safeguards technologies. If items are stored in 
70  IAEA, “Statute of the IAEA,” Article XX, entered into force on July 29, 1957.
71  IAEA, “Safeguards Glossary,” International Nuclear Verication Series No. 3, 2001, p. 28.
72  Ibid., pp. 24-25.
56     COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING
“smart” containers that can be sealed, continuously monitored, and remotely 
interrogated, then the condition and location of those materials can be 
continuously available to operators and regulators. Positive inventory control of all 
direct-use special ssionable materials might pose particular challenges for bulk 
materials in storage or in process. Yet, if bulk materials in storage are subdivided 
and containerized as they currently are at Savannah River’s K-Area Materials 
Storage site and at the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, accounting for them 
can be similar to accounting for specic items.
In-process special ssionable materials pose less of an immediate security or 
proliferation risk than, say, bulk metallic HEU because they are not immediately 
accessible. It is conceivable that positive inventory control requirements can be 
relaxed for these types of materials by reducing the frequency of inventorying and 
reporting. But states will want to know on a regular basis if and to what degree 
other states are reprocessing spent nuclear fuel or enriching uranium. e use of 
in-process monitoring and accounting tools (described earlier) holds the potential 
to fulll more stringent national-level accounting requirements than are currently 
in place. Rather than reporting inventory changes on a monthly basis, for instance, 
operators could be expected to make in-process accounting information for 
special ssionable materials available to national authorities on a weekly or even 
daily basis. 
e IAEA currently permits some quantities of special ssionable materials 
to be exempt from safeguards and material accounting. For instance, the model 
comprehensive safeguards agreement permits quantities of special ssionable 
material less than 1 kilogram in total to be exempted from detailed nuclear 
material accounting. e IAEA would make a trade-o in terms of eciency 
and cost if it were to require all states to subject all gram quantities of special 
ssionable materials to detailed nuclear material accounting, but for the purposes 
of addressing concerns about the diversion of materials to non-state actors or the 
“insider” threat, the agency ought to consider tightening these requirements, and a 
comprehensive system ought to consider adopting them.73
Source materials. While all special ssionable materials are subject to IAEA 
safeguards and national material accounting regulations, not all source materials, 
or materials that can be used to produce special ssionable materials, are. As 
noted earlier, the IAEA makes the distinction between source material “of a 
composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically 
73  Martha Williams, “On the Importance of MC&A to Nuclear Security.”
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enriched” and source material that has not yet reached this form.74 is latter 
category is not subject to detailed material accounting in the same manner as the 
former. Standard IAEA safeguards, the Additional Protocol, and most national 
regulations require commercial operators at uranium mines, concentration 
facilities (where uranium ore is crushed and processed to make uranium 
concentrate or “yellowcake”), and conversion plants (where uranium is puried 
and made into a gaseous form) to measure and report estimates of materials 
that enter and leave their facilities, but as discussed earlier, the IAEA doesn’t 
routinely transit match these numbers and operator compliance with these 
requirements can be low.75
e logic behind the distinction drawn by the IAEA and many national 
regulators between special nuclear materials and source materials is generally 
sensible, as there are a relatively small number of uranium enrichment and fuel 
fabrication plants where source materials can be made into forms that present 
greater security risks. If regulators are able to safeguard those facilities and all of 
the materials that come in and out of them, then they can be relatively certain that 
materials that would be attractive for state diversion to unauthorized uses or for 
non-state diversion are subject to detailed nuclear material accounting. 
Yet, there are still good reasons for national regulators and the IAEA to extend 
more stringent accounting requirements to some forms of source materials. For 
instance, if analysts are concerned about the risk that a state (or a non-state actor) 
is building an undeclared uranium enrichment facility, then they will also want 
to know with greater certainty than they currently do that all of the uranium 
concentrate that leaves uranium mines is properly accounted for. Without a 
steady stream of uranium concentrate, undeclared conversion and enrichment 
facilities would be without material to process. And, if each drum of uranium 
concentrate that leaves a mine is monitored to a minimum standard, by being 
assigned a barcode and tracked via an inventory control system, then a signicant 
number of missing or unaccounted-for drums of uranium concentrate would draw 
the necessary attention. It is unnecessary to characterize all of the uranium in a 
particular drum to the fullest extent possible, but making a mass calculation for 
each drum, assigning each a unique identier, and recording its destination could 
serve the larger purpose of ensuring condence in the control of the material. 
e national or international regulators whose goal it is to ensure compliance 
with nonproliferation and security objectives will require additional resources to 
74  is distinction is drawn in paragraph 34 of INFCIRC/153, the model comprehensive safeguard 
agreement.
75  Cindy Vestergaard, “Governing the (Very) Front-End of the Fuel Cycle.”
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comprehensively match transit records of these drums. 
More stringent accounting requirements are currently in place for uranium 
hexauoride cylinders than for drums of uranium concentrate. But these 
requirements should be tightened as well. Operators should be required to employ 
systems to track cylinders of uranium hexauoride during shipment and prior 
to the contents of the cylinders being introduced into, for instance, a centrifuge 
cascade. Indeed, a uniform global tracking system for these cylinders, an idea that 
has been consistently advocated for during the past decade, would t well within 
the idea of a comprehensive nuclear material accounting system.76
Facility-level requirements 
Inventory change and transaction reporting. To be capable of reporting to 
national nuclear material accounting systems on a daily basis, facilities will 
need to maintain facility-level systems capable of compiling changes to their 
nuclear material holdings on a daily basis. In MC&A parlance, this would require 
facility operators to be able to compile book inventories daily. Depending on the 
scheme whereby information is reported or shared with a national-level material 
accounting system, inventory change or transaction reports would need to be 
submitted on the day that they occur, rather than within a week or a month of a 
change in material inventory or a material transaction.
Indeed, the IAEA has developed a similar idea, “near-real-time accountancy,” to 
enable this type of awareness of material stockpiles. Near-real-time accountancy, 
which is primarily used in bulk material balance areas, involves operators making 
available inventory and inventory change data to the IAEA on a near-real-time 
basis so that inventory verication can be carried out and material balances can 
be closed more frequently than, for example, at the time of an annual physical 
inventory taking. 
Daily reporting on some materials will be relatively easy. Operators should be 
able to report if a single container of material is moved from one material balance 
area to another, or if a fuel rod is moved from a reactor to a spent fuel pool. 
However, it will be dicult to conduct daily reporting for some types of materials 
undergoing particular processes. For instance, if operators at an enrichment 
facility introduce uranium hexauoride into a cascade of centrifuges on a 
particular day, that material will not be easily accounted for absent an in-process 
accounting capability. Yet even then, it should be possible to report on a daily basis 
76  Peter Friend, et al., “A Concept for a World Wide System of Identication of UF6 Cylinders,” paper pre-
sented at the 2009 Institute for Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting.
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how much material of what concentration is introduced into a cascade, and how 
much material, and of what concentration, is removed. By tracking in-process 
inventories of materials over time, national and international inventories should be 
able to assess compliance with risk-reduction commitments, even in the absence 
of in-process monitoring capabilities.
Frequency of physical inventories and material balance reports. e process 
of conducting a physical inventory is central to verifying that facility and national 
accounting records match the amounts and characteristics of materials within a 
balance area. A material balance report is assembled aer a physical inventory 
taking and represents the most complete accounting of material stockpiles. It also 
serves as a baseline for future material accounting eorts. 
In general, the physical inventory process is time-consuming and costly. During 
a physical inventory taking, facility operators typically cease all operations, count 
and measure all or selected materials, and compile material balance reports of 
their ndings. Physical inventories in material balance areas that contain only 
items are more straight forward, as there should be no material unaccounted for 
in these areas, unless an entire item or a number of items are missing. Conducting 
physical inventories of material balance areas that house bulk or in-process 
materials is more complicated, as it oen involves sampling and measuring bulk 
materials, some of which are dicult or dangerous to access. 
In a comprehensive nuclear material accounting system, physical inventory 
taking would be central to ensuring condence in the more regular operator 
reporting of changes in inventories and of book inventories. Even if it is possible 
to remotely verify that containers holding nuclear items have not been moved or 
tampered with, it will still be necessary to conduct occasional physical inventories 
of these materials. e more frequently that physical inventories match (or are 
within the uncertainty limits of) the accounting records that are updated with each 
inventory change or transaction, the more condence users and observers will 
have in material accounting practices and systems.
In item material balance areas, some of which contain the most sensitive 
nuclear materials (e.g., intact nuclear warheads and the nuclear components of 
nuclear warheads), operators should be required to conduct frequent (at least 
monthly if not weekly) physical inventories (under the oversight of national 
regulators) that conrm the status and location of items and help to ensure the 
accuracy of accounting records. National nuclear material accounting records 
should be expected to reect the ndings of these physical inventories relatively 
quickly (within days at most, if not in near-real-time) to ensure timely information 
sharing with third parties (other states or international authorities). For physical 
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inventories to have the greatest eect, third parties should be involved in a random 
selection of physical inventory takings each year, as is current IAEA practice.
Material balance area arrangements. States with large stockpiles of nuclear 
materials have generally been reducing the number of facilities and material 
balance areas in which nuclear materials are stored.77 is move has the potential 
to streamline the process of accounting for nuclear materials within these 
countries. However, the creation of material balance areas with larger stockpiles of 
materials also poses challenges, as physical inventory taking could be more time-
consuming and costly, depending on the types and conguration of the materials. 
As part of its guide on using MC&A to achieve nuclear security objectives, 
the IAEA suggests that operators subdivide material balance areas and record 
when materials are moved between sub-areas.78 ese arrangements could help 
to address the challenge of accounting for materials in large balance areas and 
thus the challenge of consolidating materials into larger balance areas, without 
requiring the same personnel and technical infrastructure needed to operate 
additional material balance areas.
In addition to reporting movements within a balance area, all facilities should 
be required to report to national regulators movements of materials from balance 
area to balance area within a facility. is type of detailed reporting to a national 
accounting system is particularly important for nuclear weapons states where 
some facilities maintain several types and statuses of materials. For instance, the 
primary U.S. weapons assembly and disassembly facility, the Pantex Plant, houses a 
range of types and forms of materials: retired warheads (with their limited-lifetime 
components removed), assemblies and subassemblies removed from warheads, 
bare pits, etc. Some of these forms of nuclear material can be more easily and 
more quickly weaponized than others; thus it is important for a national material 
accounting system to be able to account for how much of each type of material is 
in each specic balance area, and when materials move from one balance area to 
another. is type of information will be particularly relevant in verifying nuclear 
weapons reductions and dismantlement. 
While these changes would likely move facilities toward maintaining positive 
inventory control of their most attractive nuclear materials, an even more 
fundamental change to material balance areas might be necessary to achieve 
the requisite security and nonproliferation gains. Rather than trying to nd 
77  For instance, see Pavel Podvig, “Consolidating Fissile Materials in Russia’s Nuclear Complex,” report of 
the International Panel on Fissile Materials, May 2009.
78  Martha Williams, “On the Importance of MC&A to Nuclear Security.”
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the optimal size and arrangement of material balance areas, in some facilities, 
operators could begin conceiving of each separate container as an individual 
balance area, in which a separate material accounting record is kept, a separate 
physical inventory process is conducted, and separate continuous monitoring 
is applied. Such a system would involve considerably more data than current 
material accounting practices require, but it would provide the type of ne-grain 
accounting that will be necessary for signicant quantities of weapons-usable 
nuclear materials and intact or partially intact nuclear weapons.
Unique item identiers. As part of a previous attempt to strengthen U.S. 
nuclear material management systems, U.S. scientists focused on a basic problem 
in the way that nuclear material items are currently accounted for and tracked. 
When U.S. operators ship an item from one facility to another “its [unique] 
identier changes because each site has its own identiers, which are only unique 
within a site.”79 To address this problem, the scientists suggested that each item of 
nuclear material be assigned a “permanent, complex-wide unique identier.” is 
would ensure that data about the mass, composition, etc. of the item would not be 
lost as it moved from site to site. It would also enable operators to have a record of 
the history of the item’s movements throughout the nuclear complex.
A comprehensive nuclear material accounting system would benet from a 
similarly stringent and uniform system for identifying and tracking items. Having 
continuity in item identiers would make it easier for a national system to identify 
changes in material inventories and to reconcile book and physical inventories. 
If adopted internationally, such a system of identiers could also ease the process 
of reporting on foreign-obligated materials and make it more straightforward for 
states to be assured of the continuity of material control.
As discussed earlier, systems to apply a set of unique identiers to all uranium 
hexauoride cylinders around the world are under development, and similar 
principles and technologies could be used to identify and track containers in use 
with item-level nuclear materials.
National-level requirements
In dening the objectives of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of 
Nuclear Material (SSACs), the IAEA identies two primary objectives, one 
national and one international: “to account for and control nuclear material in the 
State and to contribute to the detection of possible losses or unauthorized use or 
79  Christopher A. Aas, et al., “Defense Nuclear Material Stewardship Integrated Inventory Information Man-
agement System (IIIMS),” Sandia National Laboratories report, SAND2004-5688, November 2004.
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removal of nuclear material” and “to provide the essential basis for the application 
of IAEA safeguards pursuant to the provisions of an agreement between the State 
and the IAEA.”80 In other words, an SSAC is intended to both do the detailed, 
everyday work of accounting for and controlling nuclear materials so as to avoid 
unauthorized use, and to provide information about the management of materials, 
including material accounting data, in order satisfy the terms of international 
commitments. In practice, SSACs don’t always perform both functions equally 
well. Material accounting professionals in dierent states and government ocials 
who are familiar with how SSACs function conrm that some SSACs serve the 
latter goal of meeting international safeguards requirements without stringently 
safeguarding materials.81
In some nuclear weapons states without comprehensive safeguards agreements, 
the opposite is more oen true. Facility operators who work with nuclear 
materials on a daily basis maintain facility-level MC&A systems and are capable 
of accounting for nuclear materials within their facilities with a relatively high 
degree of certainty. Yet information about changes in nuclear material inventories 
and about material transactions are oen communicated to national systems 
in summarized or aggregate form and operators don’t always meet reporting 
requirements (see earlier discussion of the U.S. NMMSS and the Russian FIS). As 
a result, even if states with large quantities of materials and a range of fuel-cycle 
facilities, such as the United States and Russia, wanted to communicate regularly 
with an international authority or with one another about their detailed holdings 
of certain nuclear materials, their national systems as presently operated would be 
unable to do so.
In order to address the range of risks outlined in this study, all states should be 
required to maintain a capable national system that draws on material accounting 
information from facility-level accounting systems. Instead of merely conrming 
that facility-level operators are meeting their regulatory requirements and 
accounting for nancially and militarily valuable materials on an annual basis, 
national systems should be required to be a part of a system that can provide 
regular assurance to other countries and international authorities in line with 
larger nuclear security, nonproliferation, and weapons reduction commitments. 
e level and frequency of reporting and access between states and between 
states and international authorities that could be a part of a global comprehensive 
nuclear material accounting system is discussed below (see “Transparency and 
80  IAEA, “Nuclear Material Accounting Handbook,” IAEA Services Series 15, May 2008, p. 5.
81  Interviews with U.S. and foreign government ocials and safeguards experts.
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National-Facility information sharing arrangements 
Central to a comprehensive nuclear material accounting system is the ability of national- and 
facility-level nuclear material accounting systems to share nuclear material accounting data. 
While material accounting and management takes place on the facility level, a national-level 
system with regular updates of detailed facility-level data will be necessary to fulll interna-
tional information sharing and other nuclear risk reduction goals. Absent a capable nation-
al-level system, facilities would need to develop multiple channels of communication in order 
to achieve the same goals—an inecient and costly proposition. 
As part of a comprehensive nuclear material accounting system, facility- and national-level 
nuclear material accounting systems in each state would have the following capabilities: 
Facility-level systems
•	 Ability to electronically provide at least 
daily updates of facility-level accounting 
records (book inventories) to a national 
system for all special ssionable ma-
terials in all material balance areas, to 
include location, composition, and use 
of materials. 
•	 Ability to transmit physical inventory 
data and material balance reports to 
national systems as they are completed.
National-level system
•	 Ability to electronically receive at least 
daily updates of facility-level accounting 
records (book inventories) for all special 
ssionable materials in all material bal-
ance areas, to include location, composi-
tion, and use of materials.
•	 Ability to query facility-level accounting 
records on short notice.
•	 Ability to electronically share nuclear ma-
terial accounting data—either a subset 
of facility-level data or an aggregate of 
all materials data—with an international 
authority or directly with other states. 
Facility-level systems
National-level system




A subset or aggregate  
of accounting data
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Information Sharing”). Any level or frequency of transparency and reporting, 
however, would require a national nuclear material accounting system that 
maintains up-to-date databases of detailed nuclear material accounting 
information.
How could states construct such national systems? IAEA requirements 
for SSACs can serve as a basis for developing them. Indeed, in some states 
with comprehensive safeguards agreements, facility-level material accounting 
operators have already implemented “mailbox” mechanisms, in which facility 
operators communicate nuclear material accounting information to national 
and international authorities at the same time that they update their facility-
level systems.82
Alternatively, national or international authorities could be given direct access 
to facility-level material accounting databases so that they can have continuous 
access to material accounting data with little additional eort required on the part 
of facility-level operators. is process would be made complicated if each facility 
operates separately designed soware systems, as many presently do, or maintains 
its accounting records in hard-copy form only. But in theory this arrangement is 
possible. e larger problem, according to those who have analyzed the possibility 
of establishing a more centralized U.S. national nuclear material accounting 
eort, is that facility security protocols would prohibit direct access to material 
accounting databases, as would facilities’ desires to maintain individualized 
security protocols.83
Another option is for facility-level operators to regularly provide copies 
of material accounting databases or a subset of raw material accounting data 
directly to a national system.84 Doing so would protect the security of facility-
level material accounting systems and databases and allow the national system to 
provide information to other states or national authorities in a manner that would 
maintain condence in compliance with international nuclear risk reduction 
eorts. It would also limit the additional workload for facility-level operators. e 
frequency of such data “snapshots” could vary on the level of facility activity or 
material attractiveness, but weekly or daily updates could suce to provide the 
necessary condence. 
Regulatory authority. To ensure that national- and facility-level MC&A 
82  Patrick Burton, “Canadian Perspective on the State-Level Concept,” presentation at INMM Workshop on 
Evolving the IAEA State-Level Concept, May 14, 2012.
83  Christopher A. Aas et al., “Defense Nuclear Material Stewardship Integrated Inventory Information Man-
agement System (IIIMS).”
84 Ibid.
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requirements are met, each state in a comprehensive, global nuclear material 
accounting system ought to have an independent, empowered national regulator 
that is capable of evaluating compliance.85 Indeed, a comprehensive system will 
rely in part on states’ abilities to demonstrate day-to-day compliance with system 
requirements. e primary way to do this is to establish an independent regulator 
that demonstrates its reliability over time. 
Most states currently have national regulators that oversee the implementation 
of national MC&A requirements, but the independence of these regulators 
and their ability to ensure compliance vary from state to state. In some states, 
regulators are closely aligned bureaucratically and politically with commercial 
operators (in some cases these operators are state-owned enterprises) and other 
government agencies that oversee and sometimes promote the use and export of 
nuclear technologies and materials. Other states have managed to build regulatory 
institutions that have demonstrated over time their independence from other 
government agencies and commercial interests. 
e IAEA Department of Safeguards works to ensure state compliance 
with international safeguards agreements. is involves analyzing material 
accounting reports and other information related to the design of facilities and 
the implementation of safeguards. e IAEA also conducts inspections of facilities 
with nuclear materials to ensure compliance with safeguards commitments. 
e frequency and nature of these inspections vary according a range of factors, 
including the types and quantities of materials held at a facility and the activities 
conducted a facility. Another factor is the “eectiveness of the State’s accounting 
and control system” to include the promptness, consistency, and accuracy of 
material accounting reports.86 In other words, if states are able to demonstrate the 
eective implementation of national and international MC&A requirements, then 
they can limit the involvement of international regulators.
In addition to having a regulatory infrastructure that ensures compliance 
with national and international MC&A requirements, all states will need 
to increase transparency about how regulators function and about the 
performance of the systems and practices being evaluated. States will want to 
know that facility and national MC&A systems are meeting requirements, but 
they will also want to know how they are meeting their requirements and if, for 
85  U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, for instance, singles out the need for states to “adopt national rules 
and regulations . . . to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral non-proliferation 
treaties,” and to “enforce eective measures to establish domestic controls” to prevent nuclear proliferation.
86  IAEA, “Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Proto-
cols,” p. 54.
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whatever reason, they don’t.
Transparency and information sharing
e value of transparency regarding nuclear material stockpiles, to include 
materials assigned to military uses, is much debated. Nationally sanctioned 
disclosures about the amount and characteristics of materials, and their 
locations and statuses have the potential to assure allies and reassure potential 
adversaries of national activities and motivations.87 Insucient disclosures, 
pressure for greater transparency without protections on how that information 
will be used, or too much of the wrong type of information has the potential to 
prove destabilizing.88
Assuming that all states are able to construct national nuclear material 
accounting systems that maintain continuous or near-continuous accounting 
of both items and bulk special ssionable materials, what kinds of information 
(and how frequently) should states be expected to make available to other states 
or an international authority in support of global nuclear risk reduction eorts? 
A comprehensive, global nuclear material accounting system would not require 
all states to make available information about all nuclear material holdings, 
even if all of that information is available in a centralized national system. Non-
nuclear weapons states with comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements do make 
information available to the IAEA about all specied nuclear material holdings, yet 
even here, this information is kept condential by the IAEA. 
While a range of initiatives have suggested opportunities for states to declare 
their nuclear material stockpiles, few have spelled out how and to what degree 
states should share information about nuclear material holdings on a routine 
basis. A 2005 U.S. National Academy of Sciences study explored the possibility 
of states making available information about material stockpiles and granting 
foreign governments or third parties access to a subset of this information 
using cryptographic tools.89 e study envisioned a system that could “update 
declarations almost continuously,” or at the very least every time an inventory 
change was made, and that third parties would be notied of the availability of 
87  Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conict, “Comprehensive Disclosure of Fissionable Materi-
als: A Suggested Initiative,” Carnegie Corporation of New York discussion paper, June 1995; Ashton B. Carter, 
William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, “A New Concept of Cooperative Security,” Brookings Occasional 
Papers, 1992, p. 38.
88  Kristin M. Lord, e Perils and Promise of Global Transparency (Albany, NY: State University of Albany, 
2006), pp. 33-37.
89  Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, Monitoring Nuclear 
Weapons and Nuclear Explosive Materials (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2005), pp. 56-60.
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additional, more up-to-date information.
Updating international third parties or other states every time nuclear material 
inventories change would set a high bar, but it might be an unnecessarily high bar 
for some materials. If a facility’s inventory changes multiple times daily, then such 
a requirement would mean that a facility’s operators would need to make available 
information about their material holdings multiple times daily. is requirement 
might be necessary for the most attractive materials, but it would be excessive for 
less attractive materials that would require additional enrichment or processing to 
be made “weapons usable.” International third parties or other states are likely to 
want less frequent snapshots—daily or weekly—of material databases for these less 
attractive materials. 
For national nuclear material accounting systems to regularly make available 
some nuclear material accounting information to international third parties or 
directly to other states, they will need facilities with nuclear materials to maintain 
electronic material accounting databases and be both capable of and willing to 
either transmit material accounting data electronically or provide a national 
system direct access to their facility-level system. is is not currently the case for 
all facilities with nuclear materials. 
A comprehensive nuclear material accounting system should also ensure that 
states make available to each other the national laws and regulations that guide 
national- and facility-level MC&A systems. Transparency about how facilities 
manage nuclear materials on a day-to-day basis will go a long way toward 
assuring all parties that the information about nuclear material holdings that 
they receive is reliable. 
68     COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING
SECTION 6: BUILDING ON CURRENT CAPABILITIES     69
Section 6.
Building on current capabilities 
Fulfilling the vision of a comprehensive nuclear material accounting system will require considerable political accommodation among nations. Less work is necessary to develop the technical and regulatory tools 
that the eort will require. is study found that if the trajectory and focus of 
current research into nuclear material measurement and monitoring capabilities and 
information management systems is sustained over time, these systems should be 
capable of supporting a more comprehensive accounting system over the long term. 
In the short term, national and international authorities can and should build on 
current material accounting capabilities as a way to begin moving toward the more 
dicult-to-achieve objectives. By beginning to rethink the specic goals of nuclear 
material accounting and the current requirements on national- and facility-level 
systems, all states can ensure that they are equipped to meet the demands of policy 
makers and the public. Indeed, if states reevaluate their nuclear material accounting 
requirements and pursue other short-term objectives in coordination with each 
other, it could speed the process of adopting a global system. 
By tightening material requirements and exerting more control over the 
management of nuclear materials in their countries, national governments have 
the potential to improve public condence in nuclear-related enterprises, increase 
commerce in nuclear technology and materials, and reassure other states of 
their capabilities and intentions. Below is a brief list of action items that national 
governments should pursue: 
For non-nuclear weapons states
IAEA member states should review whether the IAEA MC&A requirements 
for states with comprehensive safeguards agreements and in-force additional 
protocols are sucient to meet emerging security threats, including the detection 
and deterrence of nuclear material diversion to state-level weapons programs and 
to non-state actors, and the potential for insider threats. In particular, the IAEA 
should consider: 
•	 expanding the accounting and reporting requirements for certain source 
materials to include reporting mass measurements for uranium ore 
concentrate, ensuring the transit matching of uranium ore concentrate 
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drums, and tracking uranium hexauoride containers with the assistance 
of universal unique identifying numbers; 
•	 increasing the required reporting frequency of changes to special 
ssionable material inventories and the frequency of physical inventories 
at both process and storage facilities for special ssionable materials;
•	 instituting advanced information management tools, including IAEA 
mailboxes, at all facilities with special ssionable materials to ensure the 
timely, electronic reporting of nuclear material accounting information 
from the facility level to the agency; and 
•	 requiring all facilities with nuclear materials to maintain and operate 
electronic databases of nuclear material accounting information and be 
capable of electronically transmitting or sharing that data with national 
and international authorities.
ese changes would necessitate increased funding for the IAEA Depart-
ment of Safeguards and continued support by nuclear supplier nations to states 
with underdeveloped nuclear material accounting capabilities. Once they were 
put in place, though, they should be more ecient and cost eective than cur-
rent practices.
For nuclear weapons states
All nuclear weapons states, including those outside of the NPT, should review the 
structure and requirements of their national- and facility-level MC&A systems in 
light of emerging security threats, including the possibility of diversion of nuclear 
materials to non-state actors, the potential for insider threats, and the need to 
provide international assurance that special ssionable materials are not redirected 
to military use. 
In particular, all of these states should consider adopting MC&A require-
ments for civilian materials that at a minimum meet enhanced IAEA require-
ments. Adopting these requirements would improve international under-
standing of the capabilities of accounting systems in these states, and it would 
signal weapons states’ willingness to abide by the same standards imposed on 
non-nuclear weapons states. Just as importantly, accounting for nuclear ma-
terials in a manner that could support further reductions in nuclear weapons 
stockpiles could also help to demonstrate these states’ willingness to pursue 
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their NPT Article VI commitments. ese states should also consider intro-
ducing more stringent nuclear material reporting requirements into nuclear 
cooperation agreements as a way to further prevent the diversion or misuse of 
these materials.
All nuclear weapons states should also explore the potential benets of greater 
disclosure about the amounts, status, and location of military-use nuclear 
materials and about how these materials are accounted for on a daily basis. At 
the very least, these states should make publicly available one-time declarations 
about their production and use of special ssionable materials, as the United States 
and the United Kingdom have already done. ey should also be willing to make 
publicly available general information about the management systems in place 
aimed at accounting for and managing military-use materials.
For all states 
All states should engage in cooperative research and development of technological 
capabilities that will feed directly into their capacities to participate and have 
condence in a comprehensive nuclear material accounting system. Possible areas 
of collaboration include:
•	 development of information systems that can facilitate the secure exchange 
of detailed nuclear material accounting information between states or 
between states and an international authority;
•	 development of advanced in-process measurement capabilities that will 
enable real-time material accountancy at process facilities, including 
enrichment, reprocessing, and fuel fabrication facilities; 
•	 development of containment and surveillance technologies that will enable 
continuous monitoring of nuclear materials, including items and bulk 
materials, throughout their lifetimes; 
•	 research on how nuclear material storage and process facilities can be con-
gured to ease the physical inventory taking and materials measurement 
processes; and
•	 research on the eectiveness of national nuclear regulators and ways to 
improve compliance with MC&A regulations in a manner that contributes 
to transparency eorts.
72     COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING
Many of these technical areas are currently being explored by individual 
national governments, but international, cooperative research and development 
will better ensure that all states have condence in the operating capabilities of the 
many components necessary for more comprehensive MC&A arrangements. 
To make the most of cooperative research and development, a nuclear 
weapons state (preferably the United States) should volunteer to develop a pilot 
initiative that seeks to demonstrate the technological feasibility of continuous, 
detailed accounting of both bulk and item forms of direct-use special ssionable 
materials. is eort should also involve the development and demonstration 
of information systems that are capable of securely storing nuclear material 
accounting information and making a subset of all this information available to an 
international regulator or directly to other states. is eort should seek to answer 
the following questions:
•	 What would be the nancial costs—capital costs and operating costs—of 
implementing such a system at a variety of types facilities with nuclear 
materials?
•	 How would such a system aect the ability of commercial and government 
operators to perform their currently prescribed tasks? 
•	 What adjustments could be made to lessen the impact of comprehensive 
nuclear material accounting requirements on facility operations, without 
sacricing pursuit of broad nuclear risk-reduction goals?
e United States and other nuclear weapons states have at various points 
considered establishing and have started developing information systems that 
would permit the centralization of detailed nuclear material accounting data. 
e original specications of Russia’s Federal Information System and the U.S. 
eort to develop an Integrated Inventory Information Management System were 
each moves in this direction. ese states and the IAEA have also invested in new 
technologies and capabilities that would permit continuous or near-continuous 
material monitoring and accounting. Lacking from these and other eorts was 
sucient guidance and support from policy makers who have thus far failed to 
appreciate the potential nuclear risk-reduction benets of having more continuous 
and detailed information about nuclear material holdings.
e loss of control or diversion of signicant quantities of nuclear materials 
from any state, or the inability of any state to determine if all nuclear materials in 
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civilian and military use are where they are intended to be during a crisis, would 
certainly draw attention to current shortcomings in national and international 
MC&A capabilities. e challenge for policy makers is to adopt policies and 
requirements that address these real and potentially catastrophic shortcomings 
today, as a way to lessen the probability of their occurrence and decrease their 
impact if they should occur. By prioritizing more detailed and continuous nuclear 
material accounting today, policy makers would make a substantive contribution 
to reducing overall nuclear risk for the foreseeable future.
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